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DISPARATE IMPACT IN BIG DATA
POLICING
Andrew D. Selbst*
Data-driven decision systems are taking over. No
institution in society seems immune from the
enthusiasm that automated decision-makinggenerates,
including-and perhaps especially-the police. Police
departments are increasingly deploying data mining
techniques to predict, prevent, and investigate crime.
But all data mining systems have the potential for
adverse impacts on vulnerable communities, and
Determining
predictive policing is no different.
individuals' threat levels by reference to commercial
and social data can improperly link dark skin to higher
threat levels or to greater suspicion of having
committed a particularcrime. Crime mapping based
on historical data can lead to more arrests for nuisance
crimes in neighborhoodsprimarilypopulated by people
of color. These effects are an artifact of the technology
itself, and will likely occur even assuming good faith on
the part of the police departments using it. Meanwhile,
predictivepolicing is sold in part as a "neutral"method
to counteract unconscious biases when it is not simply
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sold to cash-strapped departments as a more costefficient way to do policing.
The degree to which predictive policing systems have
these discriminatory results is unclear to the public
and to the police themselves, largely because there is no
incentive in place for a department focused solely on
"crime control" to spend resources asking the question.
This is a problem for which existing law does not
provide a solution. Finding that neither the typical
constitutional modes of police regulation nor a
hypothetical anti-discriminationlaw would provide a
solution, this Article turns toward a new regulatory
proposal centered on "algorithmicimpact statements."
Modeled on the environmental impact statements of
the National Environmental Policy Act, algorithmic
impact statements would require police departments to
evaluate the efficacy and potential discriminatory
effects of all available choices for predictive policing
technologies. The regulation would also allow the
public to weigh in through a notice-and-comment
process. Such a regulation would fill the knowledge
gap that makes future policy discussions about the
costs and benefits of predictive policing all but
impossible. Being primarily procedural, it would not
necessarily curtail a department determined to
discriminate, but by forcing departments to consider
the question and allowing society to understand the
scope of the problem, it is a first step towards solving
the problem and determining whether further
intervention is required.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Decisions
Machine-driven decision-making is everywhere.
or
supplementing
are
algorithms
learning
machine
based on
replacing human decision-making in vastly different aspects of
3
2
1
society, including consumer finance, employment, housing,
healthcare, 4 and sentencing, 5 among others. One particularly
important area of rapid adoption is predictive policing, a popular
and growing method for police departments to prevent or solve
crimes .6
Though predictive methods such as crime mapping and offender
profiling are not new, predictive policing is something different, a
creature of the world of Big Data. A police department engaged in
predictive policing uses data mining methods to find correlations
between criminal outcomes and various input data they have
collected-crime locations, 7 social networks, 8 or commercial data. 9
1 Machine-LearningPromisesto Shake Up Large Swathes of Finance, ECONOMIST (May 25,
2017), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21722685-fields-trading-creditassessment-fraud-prevention-machine-learning.
2 Tammy Wang, How Machine Learning Will Shape the Future of Hiring, LINKEDIN:
PULSE (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-machine-learning-shape-futurehiring-tammy-wang.
3 John Biggs, Naborly Lets Landlords Screen Tenants Automagically, TECHCRUNCH (Aug.
15, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/15/naborly-lets-landlords-screen-tenants-automagic
ally.
4 Bill Siwicki, Machine Learning 101: The Healthcare Opportunities Are Endless,
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/machine-lea
rning- 10 1-healthcare-opportunities-are-endless.
5 Jason Tashea, Courts Are Using Al to Sentence Criminals. That Must Stop Now, WIRED
(Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-sentence-criminals-must-stopnow.
6 See Ellen Huet, Server and Protect, FORBES, Mar. 2, 2015, at 46 ("In a 2012 survey of
almost 200 police agencies 70% said they planned to implement or increase use of predictive
policing technology in the next two to five years.").
7 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY
L.J. 259, 277 (2012).
8 See Jennifer Bachner, Predictive Policing:Preventing Crime with Data and Analytics,
IBM CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV'T 22 (2013), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/defa
ult/files/Predictive%2OPolicing.pdf ('Through [social network analysis], police can identify
individuals that are central to criminal organizations such as gangs and drug networks, and
develop effective interdiction strategies."); Jennifer A. Johnson et al., Social Network
Analysis: A Systematic Approach for Investigating, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (Mar. 5,
2013), https://leb.fbi.gov/2013/march/social-network-analysis-a-systematic-approach-for-inve
stigating (describing how law enforcement employs "social network analysis" to "discover,
analyze, and visualize the social networks of criminal suspects'.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2017

5

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2017], Art. 6

114

GEORGIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 52:109

Predictive policing is the melding of "information technology...,
criminology theory, [and] predictive algorithms." 10 Simply put, it
is "the use of data and analytics to predict crime."1
Despite its growing popularity, predictive policing is in its
relative infancy and is still mostly hype. 12 Current prediction is
akin to early weather forecasting, 13 and, like Big Data approaches
in other sectors,1 4 mixed evidence exists about its effectiveness.
Cities such as Los Angeles, Atlanta, Santa Cruz, and Seattle have
enlisted the predictive policing software company PredPol to
predict where property crimes will occur.1 5 Santa Cruz reportedly
"saw burglaries drop by 11% and robberies by 27% in the first year
of using [PredPol's] software." 16 Similarly, Chicago's Strategic
Subject List-or "heat list"-of people most likely to be involved in
a shooting had, as of mid-2016, predicted more than 70% of the

9 WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF CRIME FORECASTING IN
LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 13 (2013), https://www.rand.org/contentldam/rand/pubs/res
earch reports/RR200/RR233/RANDRR233.pdf ("Free and commercial data sets are
available for use with crime data; examples of useful analytic additions include data on
businesses, infrastructure, and demographics.").
10 Ferguson, supra note 7, at 265.
11 Bachner, supra note 8, at 6; see also CRAIG D. UCHIDA, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, No.
NCJ 230404, A NATIONAL DISCUSSION ON PREDICTIVE POLICING: DEFINING OUR TERMS AND
MAPPING SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES 1 (2009), https://wwW.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles
/nij/grants/230404.pdf ("Predictive policing refers to any policing strategy or tactic that
develops and uses information and advanced analysis to inform forward-thinking crime
prevention." (emphasis omitted)).
12 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109,
1125, 1143 (2017); see also PERRY ET AL., supra note 9, at 115 ("[P]redictive policing has
been so hyped that the reality cannot live up to the hyperbole."); Darwin Bond-Graham &
Ali Winston, All Tomorrow's Crime: The FutureofPolicing Looks a Lot Like Good Branding,
S.F. WEEKLY (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.sfweekly.com/news/all-tomorrows-crime s-thefuture-of-policing-looks-a-lot-like-good-branding/ (noting the media hype of PredPol's
predictive policing software).
13 See Ferguson, supra note 12, at 1143-44 (explaining that data, like early weather
forecasting, can provide localized results "with a significant degree of variability and
fallibility" but that "the move to objective, data-driven computer models signals an
improvement from subjective instincts or traditional guesses about the weather"); Lawrence
W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking, 42
CRIME & JUST. 377, 427 (2013) ("Like weather forecasting, individual forecasting or crime
risks uses the recent growth in supercomputers to find highly specific combinations of
predictors that raise the odds of fairly rare events occurring.").
14 See Simon Moss, Big Data:New Oil or Snake Oil?, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insi
ghts/2014/1I0big-data-new-oil-or-snake-oil/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2017).
15 See, e.g., Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 12.
16 Huet, supra note 6, at 46.
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people shot in the city, according to the police. 17 But two rigorous
academic evaluations of predictive policing experiments, one in
Chicago and another in Shreveport, have shown no benefit over
traditional policing.18 A great deal more study is required to
measure both predictive policing's benefits and its downsides.
One potential downside is clear. As Solon Barocas and I
observed in an earlier work, if its users are not careful, "data
mining can reproduce existing patterns of discrimination, inherit
the prejudice of prior decision makers, or simply reflect the
widespread biases that persist in society." 19 In August 2016,
seventeen civil rights organizations released a joint statement on
the civil rights concerns of predictive policing, emphasizing the
possibility of racist outcomes, as well as the lack of transparency,
public debate, and attention to community needs. 20 The way police
are adopting and using these technologies means more people of
color are arrested, jailed, or physically harmed by police, while the
needs of communities being policed are ignored.
Like other sectors' use of data mining, 21 predictive policing is
sold in part as a way to counteract the conscious or unconscious
17 Monica Davey, Chicago Police Try to Predict Who May Shoot or Be Shot, N.Y. TIMES
(May 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/us/armed-with-data-chicago-police-tryto-predict-who-may-shoot-or-be-shot.html.
18 PRISCILLIA HUNT ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE SHREVEPORT PREDICTIVE POLICING
EXPERIMENT 33 (2014), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research-reports/RR5
00/RR531/RANDRR531.pdf (finding no statistically significant decrease in property crime
as a result of a predictive policing effort in Shreveport, Louisiana); Jessica Saunders et al.,
Predictions Put into Practice: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of Chicago's Predictive
Policing Pilot, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 347, 366 (2016); see also DAVID ROBINSON
& LOGAN KOEPKE, STUCK IN A PATTERN: EARLY EVIDENCE ON "PREDICTIVE POLICING" AND
CIVIL RIGHTS 7-8 (2016), http://centerformediajustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Uptu
rn_-_Stuck In aPatternv.1.01.pdf (noting that the foregoing are the only two scholarly
studies produced by authors without a financial or reputational interest in the outcome).
19 See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 671, 674 (2016). Throughout this Article I will focus on racial discrimination,
primarily because that is the focus of the broader discrimination discussion as it pertains to
policing. The arguments about data and discrimination apply equally well to other classes
of vulnerable populations based on gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, as well as
non-legally protected classes such as social class. See generally id.
20 See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., PREDICTIVE
POLICING TODAY: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS (Aug. 31, 2016)
[hereinafter STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS], http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/FINALJo
IntStatementPredictivePolicing.pdf.
21 See, e.g., Daniel Castro, Data DetractorsAre Wrong: The Rise of Algorithms Is a Cause for
Hope and Optimism, CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.datainnov
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prejudices of human decision-makers-in this case the police. 22
And it has the potential to do so. But while most predictive
policing systems will not consider race expressly, express
consideration of race is not necessary for data mining to have a
A data mining system
disproportionate racial impact. 23
incorporates a series of man-made decisions that can create or
exacerbate discriminatory outcomes, independent of any intent to

do so.

24

While policing is just one of many aspects of society being
upended by machine learning, and potentially exacerbating
disparate impact in a hidden way as a result, it is a particularly
useful case study because of how little our legal system is set up to
regulate it. Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment has been seen
25
as the primary means by which Americans can regulate police.
To those familiar with the relationship between the Fourth
Amendment and race, this does not inspire hope. Case law has
largely removed claims of racial discrimination from the purview
of the Fourth Amendment, 26 and it will not provide a solution here.

ation.org/2016/10/data-detractors-are-wrong-the-rise-of-algorithms-is-a-cause-for-hope-and-opt
imism/ (arguing that many companies use big data to counteract bias in hiring and other
corporate activities).
22 See PERRY ET AL., supra note 9, at 1 ("Forecasting is considered objective, scientific,
reproducible, and free from individual bias and error.'); Joshua Brustein, This Guy Trains
Computers to Find Future Criminals, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.
comlfeatures/2016-richard-berk-future-crime/ ("Richard Berk says his algorithms take the
bias out of criminal justice."). But see Seeta Pefia Gangadharan, Predictive Algorithms Are
Not Inherently Unbiased, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/11/18/can-predictive-policing-be-ethical-and-effective/predi
ctive-algorithms-are-not-inherently-unbiased ("A misguided belief in the objectivity and
neutrality of predictive technologies permeates every step of the process-from the software
developers ...to frontline officers responding to computer recommendations of crime 'hot
spots,' to the local administrators monitoring police department performance.").
23 See Moritz Hardt, Approaching Fairness in Machine Learning, MOODY RD (Sept. 6,
2016), http:/Iblog.mrtz.org/2016/09/06/approaching-fairness.html ("Historically, the naive
approach to fairness has been to assert that the algorithm simply doesn't look at protected
attributessuch as race, color, religion, gender, disability, or family status. So, how could it
discriminate? This idea of fairness through blindness, however, fails due to the existence
of redundant encodings. There are almost always ways of predicting unknown protected
attributes from other seemingly innocuous features.").
24 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 673-74.
25 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 96
(2016) (referring to "the understandable belief that the Fourth Amendment, as a practical
matter, has preempted the field of police regulation").
26 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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As Andrew Ferguson has observed, the Fourth Amendment's
reasonable suspicion requirement is inherently a "small data
doctrine," rendering it impotent in even its primary uses when it
27
comes to data mining.
If the existing legal constraints cannot address the issues, new
legal strategies are needed. Accordingly, this Article joins the
growing call for ex ante regulation of police. 28 Generally, there are
good arguments for administrative or legislative regulation of
police rather than constitutional. As Barry Friedman and Maria
Ponomarenko argue, the need for democratic accountability is a
strong normative argument in favor of ex ante, transparent
regulations. 29 Christopher Slobogin argues that notice-andcomment procedures are needed for police because the Fourth
Amendment is not cutting it.3 ° He argues that current case law
forks between a toothless "special needs" doctrine that permits
police to do essentially anything if they say it is being done for
non-criminal reasons (even though administrative searches often
seek criminal activity in practice),3 1 and an individualized search
doctrine that judges are unwilling or unable to use to examine
large-scale programmatic practices. 32 Daphna Renan similarly
27 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 327, 338 (2015).
28 Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2051 (2016); Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko,
DemocraticPolicing,90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1833 (2015); Slobogin, supra note 25, at 95. This
push actually originated decades ago, even as the Warren Court was enshrining the Fourth
Amendment's place as the primary legal constraint on the police, but the original movement
never took hold. See David A Slansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1272-73 (2002) (discussing early scholarship of the mid-1970s
that argued for greater police rulemaking and judicial oversight).
29 Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 28, at 1889. Friedman and Ponomarenko note
that the use of "technologies that could not have been envisioned" a long time ago, when
police received general legislative grants to investigate crime, is a circumstance "in which
public rulemaking seems particularly essential" from a democratic accountability
standpoint. Id. at 1884.
30 See Slobogin, supra note 25, at 151 (summarizing the inherent problems in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence while arguing that "[a] regulatory regime based on
administrative law principles would hold law enforcement agencies more accountable').
31 Id. at 109-10; Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 107, 130 (2010) (discussing how noncriminal laws often lead to "pretextual
dragnets'); see also Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 254, 259 (2011).
32 Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stopand-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 164 (2015); Daphna
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argues that administrative law can bolster a Fourth Amendment
doctrine ill-suited to the programmatic nature of modern-day
33
policing.
Regarding predictive policing specifically, society lacks basic
knowledge and transparency about both the technology's efficacy
and its effects on vulnerable populations.3 4 Thus, this Article
proposes a regulatory solution designed to fill this knowledge
gap-to make the police do their homework and show it to the
public before buying or building these technologies.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I offers a sketch of
predictive policing from a technical perspective: how it works, how
it is used, and how the results will impact communities of color.
35
Predictive policing systems rely heavily on past crime data,
which will inevitably reproduce past biases existing in the
collection of such data.
But there are several other hidden
mechanisms by which data mining systems create or exacerbate
disparate impact, and this Part will discuss those as well.
Part II examines the failures of various standing legal
strategies. Two possibilities are considered within existing Fourth
Amendment law: direct application of disparate impact doctrine,
and the use of the individualization requirement as a substitute.
A judicial commitment to a colorblind Fourth Amendment renders
the adoption of disparate impact doctrine unlikely. And although
the Fourth Amendment can address strict racial profiling through
the requirement of individualized suspicion, that effect does not
translate to a predictive policing system that only incidentally
relies on racial proxies. Drawing on prior work in Title VII
jurisprudence, this Part ends with a discussion of why, even if
disparate impact doctrine were incorporated into Fourth
Amendment law or adopted by statute, it would still not address
the issue.
Part III introduces "algorithmic impact statements." Modeled
on the environmental impact statements of the National

Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN L. REV. 1039, 104243 (2016).
33 See generally Renan, supra note 32.
3
See Ferguson, supra note 12, at 1165-68; ROBINSON & KOEPKE, supra note 18, at 9-10.
36 ROBINSON & KOEPKE, supra note 18, at 3.
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Environmental Policy Act, 36 this proposed regulation would
mandate that, before adopting the new technology, police consider
and publicly detail the predicted efficacy of and disparate impact
resulting from their choice of technology and all reasonable
While this proposal will not rectify all that is
alternatives.
deficient in the failed regimes discussed in Part II, it is not
intended to. Rather, impact statements are designed to force
consideration of the problem at an early stage, and to document
the process so that the public can learn what is at stake, perhaps
as a precursor to further regulation. The primary problem is that
no one, including the police using the technology, yet knows what
the results of its use actually are.
Fundamentally, this is more than a policing paper. The Article
is about society's aggressive and uninformed move toward reliance
on machine learning technologies; policing is but one example of
many. The same lack of transparency and democratic buy-in that
exists in predictive policing also appears in technologies used in
many other sectors. Ultimately, impact assessments can be a tool
to fill in knowledge that is currently lacking-knowledge
necessary to even determine how future regulation should proceed.
While this Article is about the police, impact statements can be
used more broadly still.
II. THE DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS OF PREDICTIVE POLICING
Police act with incredible discretion. They choose where to
focus their attention, who to arrest, and when to use force. They
make many choices every day regarding who is a suspect and who
appears to be a criminal. 37 Examined in the aggregate, all of those
choices exhibit disproportionate impacts on poor people and people
of color. 38 This is the result of bias built into policing as an
institution, as well as unconscious biases of individual police

36

42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).

37 PERRY ET AL., supra note 9, at 41-49.

See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Race and the FourthAmendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 331, 34454 (1998) (detailing data demonstrating the effect of discriminatory police practices on
people of color); Kia Makarechi, What the Data Really Says About Police and Racial Bias,
VANITY FAIR (July 14, 2016), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/07/data-police-racial-bias
(summarizing research finding racial bias in policing).
38
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officers. 39 Thus, where police use predictive policing technology,
the purpose is not only to detect hidden patterns, but also to inject
a "neutral," data-driven tool into the process to prevent
unconscious police biases from entering the equation. 40 Predictive
policing promises both to provide auditable methods that will
prevent invidious intentional discrimination and to mitigate the
unconscious biases attending police officers' daily choices.
But at the moment, such a promise amounts to little more than a
useful sales tactic.
Data mining is likely to introduce new
discrimination or to reproduce and exacerbate the existing
discrimination in society due to various design choices that are
necessary to any data mining system. 41 Over the last few years,
examples of such discriminatory outcomes have appeared in the
news repeatedly. Google's AdWords unintentionally linked "blacksounding" names to criminal records. 42 Amazon unintentionally
43
excluded minority neighborhoods from same-day delivery services.
Risk assessment scores used in criminal sentencing overestimate
44
black recidivism and underestimate white recidivism.

39 See Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333,
1367 (2010) (discussing implicit biases in the criminal justice system); L. Song Richardson,
Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2039-40 (2011)
(explaining how both conscious and unconscious biases influence police officers' actions);
Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the FourthAmendment, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 984-91 (1999) (explaining social science data outlining how racial
schemas influence police decision-making).
40 See Mara Hvistendahl, Can Predictive Policing' Prevent Crime Before It Happens?,
SCIENCE (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/09/can-predictive-policingprevent-crime-it-happens ("[Tihe algorithms can help bring down crime rates while also
reducing bias in policing, their creators say. They replace more basic trendspotting and gut
feelings about where crimes will happen and who will commit them with ostensibly
objective analysis.").
41 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 677-93.
42 Racism is Poisoning Online Ad Delivery, Says Harvard Professor, MIT TECH. REV.
(Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/510646/racism-is-poisoning-online-ad-de
livery-says-harvard-professor/.
43 David Ingold & Spencer Soper, Amazon Doesn't Consider the Race of Its Customers.
Should It?, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-amazonsame-day/ (noting that "[iun six major same-day delivery cites... the service area excludes
predominantly black ZIP codes").
4 See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There's Software Used Across the Country to
Predict Future Criminals. And It's Biased Against Blacks, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
see
https://www.propubhica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing;
also Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination,66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 821-36 (2014); Danielle Citron, (Un)fairness of Risk
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Researchers are finding evidence of racially biased outcomes in
predictive policing as well. In 2016, Kristian Lum and William
Isaac of the Human Rights Data Analysis Group published a case
study analyzing the effects of a predictive policing algorithm if it
were applied in Oakland to police drug crime. 45 They found that
"the police data appear to disproportionately represent crimes
committed in areas with higher populations of non-white and lowincome residents."46
Taking a more theoretical approach,
computer scientists Danielle Ensign et al. have found that,
without modifications to account for biases, the most minor
difference in crime rates between two jurisdictions will lead to
"runaway feedback loops" that cause police to focus entirely on a
single jurisdiction, out of proportion with crime rates.4 7
In addition to evidence of predictive policing bias, risk
assessment scores can serve as a useful parallel because they have
some overlapping goals with predictive policing. 48 Specifically,
both methods seek to assess the likelihood that a particular person
will commit another crime in the future. However, risk
assessments have been shown to be highly problematic.
ProPublica reported that one company's software-the most
popular one used-"was particularly likely to falsely flag black
defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at
almost twice the rate as white defendants," and also routinely
"mislabeled [white defendants] as low risk more often than black
defendants." 49 While the journalistic attention is more recent,
Scores in Criminal Sentencing, FORBES (July 13, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellec
itronI2016/07/13/unfairness-of-risk-scores-in-criminal-sentencing/#4cae4bbd4ad2.
45 Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, 13 SIGNIFICANCE, Oct. 2016, at
14 (2016), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.111 1/j. 1740-9713.2016.00960.x/epdf.
46 Id. at 17.
47 Danielle Ensign et al., Runaway Feedback Loops in Predictive Policing (July 4, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.09847v2.pdf.
48 More specifically, with person-based predictive policing.
See discussion infra Part
II.B.2.
49 Angwin et al., supra note 44. Northpointe, the software developer that was the subject
of the ProPublica study, has responded that this imbalance is merely a reflection of differing
base rates of recidivism between races, and that we should focus on the rates of true
positives rather than false positives. WILLIAM DIETRICH ET AL., COMPAS RISK SCALES:
DEMONSTRATING ACCURACY EQUITY AND PREDICTIVE PARITY 1-2 (2016), http://go.volarisgro

up.com/rs/430-MBX-989/images[ProPublicaCommentary-Final_070616.pdf. There are two
problems with this response. First, their claim is unverifiable because we do not have
reliable crime data-it is therefore not clear that we even know what the base rates are.
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several scholars have discussed the potential for discrimination in
risk assessment in recent years. 50 It should, therefore, not be
surprising that predictive policing can reproduce or exacerbate the
51 It is likely that
discrimination present in traditional policing.
the discrimination in predictive policing has not been directly
observed primarily because such assessments either do not exist or
52
are proprietary.
Predictive policing's limited successes may thus be
overshadowed by uncertainty about its risks. Its advocates are
aware that an overreliance on technology can "distract attention
from the harder and more important parts of [the] process, the

See infra text accompanying notes 291-92. Second, Northpointe incorrectly presupposes
that demographic parity is the only relevant measure of fairness, when in fact various
notions of fairness are in play. See, e.g., Moritz Hardt et al., Equality of Opportunity in
Supervised Learning, 29 ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING SYSTEMS 3315 (2016),
https://papers.nips.cc/paper/6374-equality-of-opportunity-in-supervised-learning.pdf.
5o See, e.g., Kelly Hannah-Moffat, The Uncertainties of Risk Assessment: Partiality,
Transparency, and Just Decisions, 27 FED. SENT'G REP. 244, 244 (2015) (arguing that
evidence-based risk assessments are not more accurate predictors of recidivism and do not
eliminate discrimination in sentencing); Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The
Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT'G REP. 237, 240 (2015) (explaining that "relying
on prediction instruments ...will surely aggravate what is already an unacceptable racial
disproportionality in our prisons"); Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of EvidenceBased Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 538-41 (2015) (examining the unintended
consequences of "evidence-based practices" on incarceration); Sonja B. Starr, The New
Profiling: Why PunishingBased on Poverty and Identity Is Unconstitutionaland Wrong, 27
FED. SEN'G REP. 229, 229-30 (2015) (arguing that certain variables used in risk
assessments for sentencing are unconstitutional).
51 See Ferguson, supra note 12, at 1148 ('The assumptions behind predictive technologies
are affected by unseen influences that may have unintended and discriminatory
consequences.'); Hannah-Moffat, supra note 50, at 245 ("Although risk assessment tools are
characterized as objective, their scoring methods and structures actually obscure the
subjective and arbitrary nature of the questions and judgments they contain.").
52 See infra Part IV. Despite the lack of observed phenomena, several scholars have
begun to address the relationship between predictive policing and race. See generally
ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND
THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION:
PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 147-60 (2007) (criticizing
actuarial methods in policing because they tend to skew the results against the higheroffending group); Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 157, 176-77 (2013) (noting that "[s]ome scholars claim that prediction is partially to
blame for racial bias in criminal justice"); Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure:
How to Unlock the Potential of Big Data in Our CriminalJustice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 947, 969-75 (detailing racial biases in predictive algorithms); Tal Z. Zarsky,
Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1528-29 (arguing that "automated
prediction can lead to illegal discrimination" based on personal attributes such as race).
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parts that rely on imagination and judgment." 53 Though "humans
54
remain-by far-the most important elements in the process,"
automation bias can set in and convince the human operators that
the machine knows better than they do. 55 This is particularly
56
disconcerting with respect to hidden, systemic biases in the data.
Given the history of racially discriminatory policing, it is
especially important that police understand their tools' capacity
57
for discriminatory outcomes and vigilantly guard against them.
Predictive policing systems operate in different ways, depending
on the type of data they collect and what they seek to achieve. This
section explains how predictive policing works at a technical level,
and why that will result in a disparate impact on communities of
color.
A. SOME CLARIFICATION ON TERMINOLOGY

As an initial matter, it will be useful to define some terms. The
words "discrimination," "fairness," and "bias" evoke a family of
related concepts, and their use in this Article will benefit from
disambiguation.
Merriam-Webster offers three definitions of
"discrimination," each differently applicable in the data mining
context: (1) "the practice of unfairly treating a person or group of
people differently from other people or groups of people"; (2) "the
ability to recognize the difference between things that are of good
quality and those that are not"; and (3) "the ability to understand
that one thing is different from another thing."5 8 Data mining is
the process of finding patterns among different people or outcomes

63 DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, The PersistentPull of Police Professionalism,NEW PERSPECTIVES
IN POLICING 9-10 (Mar. 2011).
54 PERRY ETAL., supranote 9, at 117.
55 See Danielle Keats Citron, TechnologicalDue Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 127172 (2008); see also Cathy O'Neil, The Ethical Data Scientist, SLATE (Feb. 4, 2016), http:/!
www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/02how-to-bring betterethics to dat
a_science.html ("[P]eople have too much trust in data to be intrinsically objective .... ").
56 See PERRY ET AL., supra note 9, at 116, 122 (noting that "biases in the inputs will skew
the predictions" and that "it is important to understand how the data are collected because
they may have systematic biases").
57 See HARCOURT, supra note 52, at 169-70 (describing the social costs that will result if
predictive policing tools increase actual or perceived discriminatory outcomes).
58 Discrimination,MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disc
rimination (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
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to determine what aspects make them similar or different.5 9 Thus,
the ultimate goal of the data miner is to build a system that can
discriminate in the third sense. And to the extent the data mining
system is used in a ranking scheme, the second definition is just as
clearly implicated. It is the first definition, however, that is the
concern of both this Article and the broader algorithmic
60
accountability movement.
As the first definition suggests, discrimination in the legal
sense is closely tied to the concept of "fairness." In fact, so as to
avoid ambiguity, the computer science community that concerns
itself with these same issues will often refer to "fairness" rather
than "discrimination."6' But further disambiguation is required. It
is possible for either a system or person to "unfairly treat[ ] a
person or group of people." If the system treats someone unfairly,
it is not necessarily because any person intended such a result,
therefore, systemic discrimination is measured by its effect. In
American anti-discrimination jurisprudence, this maps onto
"disparate impact" doctrine, albeit imperfectly. 62 Contrarily, if a
person treats someone unfairly on account of membership in a
protected class, such action relates to intent and maps onto
disparate treatment doctrine. 63 A third conceptual category
exists-that of "classificatory harms"-but this separate concept is
contained doctrinally within disparate treatment, and it is not
59 See, e.g., Liane Colonna, A Taxonomy and Classificationof Data Mining, 16 SMU SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 309, 310 (2013) (describing data mining generally); Daniel J. Steinbock,
DataMatching, DataMining, and Due Process,40 GA. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2005) (same).
60 See, e.g., More Accountability for Big-DataAlgorithms, NATURE (Sept. 21, 2016), http://
www.nature.com/news/more-accountability-for-big-data-algorithms-1.20653 ("Fortunately, a
strong movement for greater 'algorithmic accountability' is now under way in academia and,
to their credit, parts of the tech industry such as Google and Microsoft.").
61 See, e.g., Cynthia Dwork et al., Fairness Through Awareness, 3 PROC. INNOVATIONS
THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCI. CoNF. 214 (2012). As of 2015, there is an annual conference
dedicated to questions of fairness in machine learning, called the Conference on Fairness,
Accountability and Transparency (FAT*) (formerly "Fairness, Accountability and
Transparency in Machine Learning (FAT/ML)"). See CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY (FAT*), http://www.fatconference.org/ (last visited
Oct. 25, 2017).
62 See Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of DisparateImpact: DoctrinalReconstruction, Fair
Housing and Lending Law, and the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 411
(1998) (explaining that the same standard is '"nown variously as 'the effects test,'
'discriminatory effects,' or (most commonly), 'disparate impact' ").
63 See Richard Primus, The Future of DisparateImpact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1351 &
n.56 (2010).
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universally recognized as discrimination without more. 64 For all
three concepts, the law only recognizes the policy as
"discrimination" if it is directed at a protected class, such as race,
65
gender, age, disability, or in some cases, sexual orientation.
This Article addresses only disparate impact. This is because
disparate impact is the most likely form of discriminatory harm to
result from data mining. 66 With respect to data mining, a
classificatory harm means the use of protected class identifiers as
inputs to predictive policing models. 67 This is not currently done68
presumably for fear of running afoul of equal protection doctrine.
Otherwise, if police want to intentionally discriminate, there are
easier ways of getting away with it than hiding it in the data. This
Article also uses the phrase "disparate impact" as shorthand for
the general concept of measuring discrimination by effect rather
than for the doctrinal rule. This is because, in the policing context,
there is no extant doctrinal hook for disparate impact, 69 so there is
no doctrinal referent. Because it only addresses disparate impact,
this Article will refer interchangeably to discrimination and
disparate impact, such as in the phrase "discriminatory data
mining."
This Article also uses the word "bias" in several instances. The
word "bias" is often used to mean "prejudice" or "intentional
discrimination," as when describing a person as "biased. '70 That is
not the case here. Instead, the word has two meanings in this
Article. When referring to a bias in a model, it is used in the
statistical sense to mean a factor that changes the result in a way

r

Id.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (delineating Title VII's protected classes as
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
6 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 693.
67 See id. at 695.
68 However, there is good evidence that use of protected class identifiers could actually
help rid the machine learning models of the disparate impact described in the next section,
and may, in fact, be necessary. See, e.g., Indre Zliobaite & Bart Custers, Using Sensitive
Personal Data May Be Necessary for Avoiding Discrimination in Data-Driven Decision
Models, 24 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE L. 183, 185 (2016).
69 Policing is primarily regulated through the Constitution, and equal protection doctrine
does not recognize disparate impact. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
65

70

Bias, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarybias

(last visited

Sept. 17, 2017).
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that is unaccounted for. 1 This Article also refers to people's
"unconscious" or "implicit" biases, which refer to the implicit
associations that people make without realizing they do so--a
subject of a great deal of psychological and legal research at the
72
end of the last century.
Finally, there is one part of the discrimination discussion that
requires disambiguation, not as a matter of terminology, but as an
actual conceptual disagreement over whether a result should be
considered discrimination. This occurs when a data mining model
makes decisions based on proxies for protected classes and, in the
process, rediscovers inequalities already present in society.7 3 The
disagreement over whether this is discrimination at all is explored
later, 74 and that discussion points to the important distinction
75
between competing conceptions of "fairness" as well.
B. HOW PREDICTIVE POLICING DISCRIMINATES

. The use of predictions in policing is not a new construct. Crime
mapping, which allows the police to allocate more resources to
where crime is more likely to occur, has been around for a very
long time. 76 Police used to plot crime on a map by hand to see if
hot spots emerged.7 7 Offender profiling, in which police examine
psychological and environmental factors to predict an unknown
suspect's identity or to anticipate the next crime, is another form
of prediction that has been around for ages. 78 Despite being
71 See id. ("(d)(1): deviation of the expected value of a statistical estimate from the
quantity it estimates (2): systematic error introduced into sampling or testing by selecting
or encouraging one outcome or answer over others.").
72 See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
73 See Barocas & Selbst, supranote 19, at 691-92.
74 See discussion infra Parts II.C, IV.B.2.

75

Jon Kleinberg et al., Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores,

PROC. INNOVATIONS THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCI. (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.05807
vi.pdf.
76 See
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment:
Redrawing "High-CrimeAreas," 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 184 (2011).
77 Andrew Ferguson points readers to a story in which a police chief in Lincoln, Nebraska
put pins in a map during the Teddy Roosevelt administration. Id. at 184 n.24 (citing
SPENCER CHAINEY & JERRY RATCLIFFE, GIS AND CRIME MAPPING 8 (2005)).
78 See PETER B. AINSWORTH, OFFENDER PROFILING AND CRIME ANALYSIS 7-15 (2001)
(noting that offender profiling "generally refers to the process of using all the available
information about a crime, a crime scene, and a victim, in order to compose a profile of the
(as yet) unknown perpetrator"); BRENT E. TURVEY, CRIMINAL PROFILING: AN INTRODUCTION
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backward-looking in time, offender profiling is similar to
prediction because rather than asking whether a given suspect
the traits
committed the crime, the police create a model to guess
79
of a person who would likely have committed the crime.
Nonetheless, the concept of "predictive policing" is something
The phrase typically refers to policing methods that
new.
Predictive policing is the logical
incorporate data mining.8 0
offender profiling to a world with
and
mapping
crime
of
extension
more available data and processing power.8 ' The fundamental
premise behind profiling is that a good portion of crime occurs in
predictable patterns, and if police can root out those patterns, they
can either prevent crime or catch the criminals.8 2 According to
advocates, predictive policing performs essentially the same
operation as criminal profiling, but because it uses more data and
computers to find the patterns, it is both more accurate and more
83
reliable.
Data mining is the use of machine learning techniques to find
useful patterns and relationships in data.84 It works by exposing a
machine learning algorithm to examples of cases of interest with
known outcomes.8 5 The computer then builds a predictive modela set of correlations that determine which related attributes can
serve as useful proxies for an otherwise unobservable outcome.
Once those attributes are discovered, the computer compares new
subjects' traits to those observed 6 attributes to make a prediction
8
about the unobservable outcome.

TO BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE ANALYSIS 38 (4th ed. 2012) ("Criminal profiling has a legal
history that can be traced back to the blood libeling of Jews in Rome, 38 CE.").
79 Anticipating future acts specifically is also called "forecasting," but the use of statistical
techniques is common throughout predictive policing. PERRY ETAL., supra note 9, at 1.
80 See Bachner, supra note 8, at 9.
81 See Ferguson, supra note 7, at 270-72.
82 See id. at 271-284.
83

See Boonsri Dickinson, In Philadelphia,Predictionand Probability in Crime Patterns,

ZDNET (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.zdnet.com/article/in-philadelphia-prediction-and-proba
bility-in-crime-patterns/ (discussing the algorithms' improvements on techniques in use
since the 1920s that lacked support from fundamental science).
84 See, e.g., Usama Fayyad, The Digital Physics of Data Mining, 44 COMM. ACM 62, 62
(Mar. 2001) (describing data mining generally).
85

See Pedro Domingos, A Few Useful Things to Know About Machine Learning, 55

CoMM. ACM 78, 78-80 (Oct. 2012).
86 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 678.
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In predictive policing, the observed attributes come from data
that the police mine from various sources. There are several
different approaches to predictive policing. Some primarily use
data about past criminal activity, such as crime locations and
arrest records, but others incorporate many other types of data.
These companies sometimes purchase tools "largely developed by
and for the commercial world,"'8 7 as well as data from social
networks such as Facebook and Twitter.8 8 The unobservable cases
of interest are the location and time of future crimes, the likely
perpetrators or victims of future crimes, and likely suspects in
past crimes.
One report "found a near one-to-one correspondence between
conventional crime analysis and investigative methods and the
more recent 'predictive analytics' methods" 8 9 -which is to say that,
for the most part, police methods have not changed, but the
predictive analytics substitute for the older modes of analysis.
While police seek the same sorts of answers as before, data mining
allows them to find patterns that they could not have otherwise
discovered on their own. 90 Police have long understood that some
crime is hyperlocal, resulting in the formation of hotspots. 91
Offender profiling has its basis in the psychology of crime and
criminals, although its efficacy has never truly been clear. 92 But
whereas past forms of prediction relied on some theory of
87 PERRY ET AL., supra note 9, at 2; see generally Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little
Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your
Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004).
88 See John Buntin, Social Media Transforms the Way Chicago Fights Gang Vwlence,
GOVERNING (Oct. 2013), http://www.governing.com/topics/urban/gov-social-media-transforms-c
hicago-policing.html (describing the use of social media data in policing techniques in
Chicago); Johnson et al., supra note 8 (explaining that the use of social network analysis is "a
valuable tool for law enforcement'); Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook, Twitter
And Instagram Sent Feeds That Helped Police Track Minorities In Ferguson And Baltimore,
Report Says, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switchl
wp/2016/10/1 1/facebook-twitter-and-instagram-sent-feeds-that-heped-police-track-minoritiesin-ferguson-and-baltimore-aclu-says/.

89 PERRY ET AL., supra note 9, at xiv.
9o See Bachner, supra note 8, at 17 ("[O]ne of the key benefits of predictive policing is that

previously unknown or overlooked patterns [in the raw data] emerge....').
91 See Ferguson, supra note 7, at 273-76 (discussing criminology theories of "repeated
patterns of localized crime").
92 See AINSWORTH, supra note 78, at 176-78 (noting that the accuracy or profiling is
largely unknown and that "even if it were possible" to determine, "accuracy does not equate
with utility").
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criminology, data mining allows the same correlative principles to
be expanded more broadly. Data mining allows police to operate
unconstrained by theory, finding correlations without worrying
93
about why they work.
The majority of predictive policing systems in use are either
"place-based" systems that aim to predict when and where future
crime will occur, or "person-based" systems that attempt to predict
offenders, determine the identities of perpetrators, or predict
Person-based systems can be separated
potential victims. 94
further into those used to solve a particular crime-what I call
"suspect-based" systems 95-or those used to assess individuals'
threat levels in the abstract.96 Some technical detail about how
the systems work will be important to understanding why, without
care, they are likely to result in disparate impacts against
vulnerable communities. That discussion follows.
Place-Based Predictive Policing. Place-based systems,
1.
including the well-known examples of software from PredPol and
97
HunchLab, are the most common type of predictive policing.
While this discussion begins with place-based predictive policing,
the three types are not so fundamentally different. Understanding
the pitfalls of one is key to understanding where all three types of
Ultimately, however, the
predictive policing can go wrong.
93 See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUJKER, BIG DATA 55 (2013) ("No longer
do we necessarily require a valid substantive hypothesis about a phenomenon to begin to
understand our world."); Rob Kitchin, Big Data, New Epistemologies and Paradigm Shifts,
BIG DATA & SoC!, Apr.-June 2014, at 1, 2 ("Big Data analytics enables an entirely new
epistemological approach for making sense of the world; rather than testing a theory by
analysing relevant data, new data analytics seek to gain insights 'born from the data.' "). A
complete absence of theory from data mining is actually a bit of an exaggeration.
Background assumptions are required simply for machine learning to work, but those
assumptions need not be detailed. See Domingos, supra note 85, at 81 (explaining that
"[e]very learner must embody some knowledge or assumptions beyond the data it is given in
order to generalize beyond it," but that "very general assumptions... are often enough to
do very well").
94 See PERRY ET AL., supra note 9, at 8 (explaining that some approaches are used "to
forecast places and times with an increased risk of crime" and others to "identify individuals at
risk of offending in the future'); ROBINSON & KOEPKE, supra note 18, at 2; see also Ferguson,
supra note 12, at 1126-43 (discussing the iterations of predictive policing "1.0" (place-based
property crime), "2.0"(place-based violent crime), and "3.0" (person-based crime)).
95 This is my term, designed to distinguish from "person-based."
9 See ROBINSON & KOEPKE, supra note 18, at 3 (describing person-based systems as those
"predicting the identities of people particularly likely to commit ... certain kinds of crime').
97 See id. at 3-4.
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disparate impact harm of each is different in both form and
degree.
Place-based predictions are primarily focused on hot-spot
detection, which, in turn, is used mostly for resource
management. 98 Police want to put more officers where crime is
occurring. Occasionally, if there is a very specific pattern, the
police may be able to predict the next instance in a crime spree,
but the tools are not usually that specific.
The potential for harm stemming from racially imbalanced
outcomes is the harm resulting from having more police in a
neighborhood that is unfairly maligned as having more crime. If
one believes that all crime should lead to arrest, one may not
readily see the harm from over-policing nonwhite neighborhoods. 99
After all, if the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment are observed,
only people likely committing crimes will be arrested. But that
picture is not the reality. First, a great deal of crimes-such as
minor drug use or public intoxication-do not always lead to arrest.
They are often not observed, or if observed, an arrest is subject to
police discretion. 10 0 Unsurprisingly, these arrests for such crimes
are more common among people of color. 10 1 Second, even for nonnuisance crimes, police have limited resources. Hypothetically, if a
city has two racially segregated neighborhoods--one black, one
white-and has enough of a murder problem that not all of them in
either neighborhood can be solved, a police policy that focuses
entirely on the black neighborhood would not be normatively
acceptable, even if all the people the police arrest individually
deserve to be arrested. Thus, on a systemic level, over-policing
nonwhite neighborhoods does present a fairness harm.
So how does it happen? There are several mechanisms by which
this type of data mining system could result in a disparate impact
98 E.g., About PredPol, PREDPOL, http://www.predpol.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 25,
2017) ("PredPol aims to keep communities safer. Our day-to-day operations tool identifies
where and when crime is most likely to occur so that you can effectively allocate your patrol
resources and prevent crime.').
99 For an excellent account of the devastation over-policing and mass incarceration have
caused communities of color, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012).

100 See ROBINSON & KOEPKE, supra note 18, at 5 (citing the disparate arrest rates for
white and black marijuana users that is caused "in part... [because] police exercise an
extraordinary degree of discretion in deciding what to report as crimes'.
101 See ALEXANDER, supra note 99, at 98-99, 185.
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on protected classes. 10 2 These mechanisms correspond to the
different steps in the workflow: 10 3 (1) designing the problem; (2)
collecting the training data and labeling examples within it; (3)
selecting features to model; and (4) the potential for accidentally
using proxies for a protected class. 10 4 Each of these mechanisms
has an application to the realm of predictive policing.
First, data miners must define the problem in a way that a
computer can understand. 10 5 An officer cannot merely ask a
computer, "How can I prevent crime?" Rather, the officer must
take an amorphous question about the world and translate it such
that the outcome can be expressed as "the value of some target
variable."10 6 For example, PredPol divides a map into 500ft x

102 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 677-93. Of the various versions of predictive
policing, a suspect-based system is the most related to those used in the employment
context in which we wrote. There, an employer will have a model of what a person with
good or bad outcomes looks like and will test that model against a particular candidate.
The same is true when the police look for a suspect-thus, the concerns are the same.
103 This is actually the workflow of a supervised learning system. For the purposes of this
Article, I will only discuss supervised learning because that is what is overwhelmingly used
today. See COMM. ON THE ANALYSIS OF MASSIVE DATA ET AL., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
FRONTIERS IN MASSIVE DATA ANALYSIS 104 (2013), http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid=18374 (noting that "[p]redictive modeling is referred to as supervised learning in the
Supervised learning techniques include classification,
machine-learning literature").
estimation, and prediction. Id. at 104-06. Forms of data mining that involve sorting or
ranking of outcomes involve supervised learning. Id. at 115. Unsupervised learning
includes techniques such as clustering, which means grouping elements of a set based on
similarity without specifying any particular outcome beforehand. Id. at 102. Thus, if all
crime in a city over a period of time were plotted, and a data miner specified a certain
number of clusters, the algorithm would determine where the crimes were most tightly
focused. Id. at 103. The primary difference between supervised and unsupervised learning
is whether the data miner seeks a value of a target variable, or instead wants to find
something interesting about the data without specifying ahead of time what is sought. Id.
at 101. While unsupervised learning techniques suffer from many of the same pitfalls as
supervised learning, the difficulties with problem definition look different because
unsupervised learning does not solve a specified problem in the same way. There is also a
third type of machine learning, known as "reinforcement learning," in which machines are
able to interact with the world separately from human involvement and learn from their
interventions. However, it is not used in predictive policing systems. See M.I. Jordan &
T.M. Mitchell, Machine Learning: Trends, Perspectives, and Prospects, SCIENCE, July 17,
2015, at 258, http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci349/6245/255.full.pdf.
104 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 677-93; see also PETE CHAPMAN ET AL., CRISPDM 1.0: STEP-BY-STEP DATA MINING GUIDE 10-12 (2000).
105 Barocas & Selbst, supranote 19, at 678.
106 Id.
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500ft squares, and for each, the target variable becomes the
10 7
likelihood of a given crime.
But the categories are not always obvious. If the system is
designed to detect crimes within a particular square on a map, it
should separate out types of crime. Should "type of crime" be
broken down into violent and nonviolent? Should property crimes
or nuisance crimes be counted separately? Should nuisance crimes
then be further broken down? Deciding how to parse the problem
can have severe consequences for the ultimate outcome. 0 8 For
example, if the nuance between robberies and burglaries is
missing because both are placed in the "property crime" bucket,
the algorithm may not detect the difference between an area with
high amounts of robberies and an area with a high number of
burglaries, though the two crimes might be perpetrated by
different people with different victims.
Using data mining also tends to bias organizations toward
questions that are easier for computers to understand. 10 9 Property
crime prediction is a common goal of predictive policing because
"[b]urglars tend to be territorial,"' 10 and geographic analyses are
relatively easy to create. A police department is thus likely to
focus more on property crime than it otherwise would."' It is
doubtful that the demographics of property crime are exactly the
same as other crimes, so skewing the system in this way not only
affects the absolute ratio of type of crimes policed, but also the
demographics. A similar bias may result from what systems are
commercially available. If companies offer systems designed to
107Technology, PREDPOL, http://www.predpol.com/technology/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2017)
(describing in detail the technology used by PredPol).
108 See Oscar H. Gandy Jr., Engaging Rational Discrimination:Exploring Reasons for
PlacingRegulatory Constraints on Decision Support Systems, 12 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 29,
38 (2010).
109 See, e.g., Jon Kleinberg et al., PredictionPolicy Problems, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 491, 494
("[I]mproved prediction using machine learning techniques can have large policy impacts...
[but e]ven this small set of examples are biased by what we imagine to be predictable.).
110 Nate Berg, Predicting Crime, LAPD-Style, THE GUARDIAN (June 25, 2014), https://www.
theguardian.com/cities/2014/jun/25/predicting-crime-lapd-los-angeles-police-data-analysis-alg
orithm-minority-report (quoting Captain John Romero of the LAPD Real-Time Analysis and
Critical Response Division).
111 See Elizabeth E. Joh, PolicingBy Numbers: Big Data and the FourthAmendment, 89
WASH. L. REV. 35, 58 (2014). The same is likely true of nuisance crimes. CATHY O'NEIL,
WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: How BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS
DEMOCRACY 89 (2016).
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detect property crimes, but other crimes have no similar system,
law enforcement are likely to choose to police the former. In early
2017, this bias led Sam Lavigne, Francis Tseng, and Brian Clifton
to create a satirical, white-collar crime predictor based on the
same place-based predictive policing methods that could be used
112
for street crime.
The next biases come from the training data. A data mining
system learns by example, and must take its training data as
"ground truth," because that data is the only information the
algorithm has about the outside world. 113 A big part of getting the
data right is correctly labeling the examples the algorithm is
trained on.1 14 The most common source of data for predictive
policing algorithms-used in every version of predictive policing in
existence-is past crime data, often collected by the police
themselves. 115 Therefore, in predictive policing, labeling examples
will commonly mean determining whether a data point was or was
not a crime, and if so, what type of crime it was. Reliance on past
data is problematic, though, as accurate crime data rarely
1 16
exists.
There are several reasons for this, but one major reason is that
the most systematic contact police departments have with
"criminals" is at the moment of arrest.1 1 7 Results after arrest are

112 Sam Lavigne, Francis Tseng & Brian Clifton, White Collar Crime Risk Zones, THE NEW
INQUIRY (Apr. 26, 2017), https://thenewinquiry.com/white-collar-crime-risk-zones/. Predictive
systems also exist for financial crimes, but those crimes might be under the jurisdiction of
another agency such as the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Mary Jo White, Chair,
SEC, Keynote Address at the 41st Annual Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 27, 2014)
(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech1370540677500)
(describing the SEC's NEAT program as using data mining to identify insider trading).
113 Barocas & Selbst, supranote 19, at 682.
114 Id.
115 ROBINSON & KOEPKE, supra note 18, at 3-4 (listing predictive policing systems and

noting that historical crime data is used in all of them).
116

See DELBERT S. ELLIOT, CTR. FOR THE STUDY AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, LIES,

DAMN LIES AND ARREST STATISTICS 1 (1995); DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY

RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 75-78 (2002); Lawrence W. Sherman & Barry D. Glick,
The Quality of PoliceArrest Statistics, POLICE FOUND. REP., Aug. 1984, at 1.
117 See HARRIS, supra note 116, at 77 (explaining that arrest rates are poor measures of
criminal activity and are instead merely measures of law enforcement activity, as arrest
rates only indicate contact with police and do not fully and accurately depict all offenders or
instances of criminal activity). Reporting of crime and suspicious activity by citizens is also
biased. See Jason Tashea, Websites and Apps for Sharing Crime and Safety Data Have
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often not updated. 118 Thus, most research in crime statistics 1 9
and most actuarially-driven criminal justice systems 120 use arrest
data as the best available proxy, even though arrests are racially
biased 2 1 and in other ways a poor proxy for crime. 122 Even if postarrest statistics were collected, a great number of cases end in plea
agreements that do not reflect the crime the arrestee committed or
was originally arrested for-thus, using these statistics would not
solve the problem either. 23 As a result, a majority of crime labels
may be incorrect, whether describing a type of crime or the
existence of one, and thus models will learn that people of color
commit a higher percentage of "crimes" than they do in reality. It
is worth emphasizing again that-due to "redundant encodings" in
the data sets-a model need not have race as an input to correlate
an output with race. It will simply detect those other encodings
that are good real-world proxies for race and rely on them
124
instead.
Training data must also be a representative sample of the
whole population. The ultimate goal of data mining is patternmatching and generalization,1 25 and without a representative
sample, generalizing introduces sampling bias.1 26 There are many
potential sources of sampling bias. For example, data can be
skewed by past historical practices. When police allocate more
resources in areas where there has been more crime in the past,

Become Outlets for Racial Profiling,A.B.A. J. (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/ma
gazine/article/crime-safety-website-racial-profiling.
118

ELLIOT, supra note 116, at 2.

Id. at 1.
See Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 98 (2017); see
also Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 815 (2015) (describing how
arrests are used as proxies outside the criminal context "not necessarily because they are
the best screening tools," but "because they are relatively easy and inexpensive to access
and because [noncriminal justice actors] regard arrests as proxies for information they
value, such as the potential for violence, unreliability, or instability").
121 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on the Freeway, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L.
REV. 117, 121 (2001).
122 Jain, supra note 120, at 832.
123 Eaglin, supra note 120, at 101-04.
124 See Hardt, supra note 23 (describing how machine learning often results in the
program "predicting unknown protected attributes for other seemingly innocuous features").
125 Domingos, supra note 85, at 80.
126 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 686.
119
120
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12 7
crimes in those areas will be over-represented in future data.
This error is the best-understood version of algorithmic
Bernard
discrimination as applied in the policing context.
Harcourt discussed it in his 2007 book arguing against actuarial
policing. 128 Worse yet, when predictive policing is used specifically
to figure out where to put more officers, this phenomenon creates a
positive feedback loop that further skews future data, as the
increased police presence will lead to detection of more crimes in
that area.1 29 Reporters and advocates have recognized these
dangers. 130 An August 2016 statement released by seventeen civil
rights organizations noted that predictive policing would be
inherently biased because of its reliance on past crime data that
"primarily document[s] law enforcement's response to the reports
they receive and situations they encounter, rather than providing
1 31
a consistent or complete record of all the crimes that occur."
Another source of discriminatory effect is feature selection. Data
miners must "make choices about what attributes they observe and
subsequently fold into their analyses."1 32 By necessity, the police

127

Scott L. Johnson, The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Police Profiles, in THE SYSTEM IN

BLACK AND WHITE: EXPLORING THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN RACE, CRIME, AND JUSTICE 93,

105 (Michael W. Markowitz & Delores D. Jones-Brown eds., 2000) (noting that "profiles
legitimate past bias.., which then generates more bias"); William J. Stuntz, The Political
Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791 (2006) ('Whom the police catch
depends on where they look.").
128 See HARCOURT, supra note 52, at 147-50 ("[If the police dedicate more resources to
investigating, searching, and arresting members of a higher-offending group, the resulting
distribution of arrests ... will disproportionately represent members of that higheroffending group.").
129 Ensign et al., supra note 47; see also HARCOURT, supra note 52, at 147-50 (discussing
what he calls the "ratchet effect').
130 See STATEMENT OF CIvIL RIGHTS GROUPS, supra note 20 (stating the position of various
advocacy groups that predictive policing will only exacerbate the disproportionate scrutiny
that minority communities are subjected to from law enforcement); Bryan Llenas, Brave
New World of 'PredictivePolicing' Raises Specter of High-Tech Racial Profiling, Fox NEWS
(Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/02/24/brave-new-world-predictive-polici
(quoting attorney and activist Hanni
ng-raises-specter-high-tech-racial-profiling.html
Fakhoury as saying "if the data is biased to begin with and based on human judgment, then
the results the algorithm is going to spit out will reflect those biases"); Matt Stroud, The
Minority Report: Chicago's New Police Computer Predicts Crimes, But Is It Racist?, THE
VERGE (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.theverge.com/2014/2/19/5419854/the-minority-report-th
is-computer-predicts-crime-but-is-it-racist (citing "red flags" that have been raised by
Chicago's predictive policing system).
131

STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS, supra note 20.

132

Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 688.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2017

27

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2017], Art. 6

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

136

[Vol. 52:109

make judgment calls about where geographic hot spots are, what
features they should aim to contain, and how big they should be. 133
They must also decide whether to remain simple and take into
account only location, crime type, and date and time, as PredPol
does, 134 or include many other variables like socioeconomic
indicators, weather, seasonality, recurring events and holidays, and
proximity of other known offenders-as is the case with a product
like HunchLab. 135 These choices have downstream effects.
The possibility of error rates is exacerbated if police or the
software companies they contract with add features by purchasing
data from data brokers. Their profiles often are not correct 36 and,
137
at best, are optimized for commercial uses, not police work.
Data brokers assemble these profiles with the assumption that
they will be used for targeted advertising, 138 where the total stakes
for an errant profile is the risk that someone sees an incorrect
advertisement. Data brokers' incentives are to make their models
just good enough so that their customers can profit more by using
them than by not using them. 139 This is a very error-tolerant
metric. There is no reason to suspect that low absolute error rates
are even of interest to commercial data brokers-that they will
not, for example, link information to the wrong person,1 40 or that
they have any interest in assuring the representativeness of their
1 41
data sets.

See Bachner, supra note 8, at 20.
About PredPol,PREDPOL, http://www.predpol.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2017).
135 AZAVEA, HUNCHLAB: UNDER THE HOOD 12 (2015), https://cdn.azavea.com/pdfs/hunchla
b/HunchLab-Under-the-Hood.pdf.
136 See Bobby Allyn, How the Careless Errors of Credit Reporting Agencies Are Ruining
People's Lives, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/
wp/2016/09/08/how-the-careless-errors-of-credit-reporting-agencies-are-ruining-peples-lives.
133
134

137

FED. TRADE COMM'N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

38 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparenc
y-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
138 See id. at 26-27.

139 See id. at 36 ("The procedures that the data brokers use to assure the quality of the
data they provide to clients depend on the type of product at issue and the data broker's
business model.").
140 See Jain, supra note 120, at 832 ("Arrest data may be linked to the wrong personparticularly when arrested individuals have common names or provide false identification
at the time of their arrest.").
141 See O'NEIL, supra note 111, at 12-13.
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Finally, the coarseness or granularity of features could affect
outcomes along the lines of protected class. Features at the wrong
level of granularity can result in generalizations that are
"simultaneously rational and unfair" because certain individuals
are "actuarially saddled" by statistically sound inferences that are
nevertheless inaccurate. 142 That is, proximity or similarity to
certain groups of outcomes will cause an inappropriate adverse
determination. But feature selection is unavoidably subjective,
and it is often unclear beforehand whether is it more accurate or
unfair to define the location of a crime by address, 500-foot square,
city block, or square mile. Moreover, the more "accurate" decision
may not lead to the fairest result for people swept up in that
region.
2. Person-BasedPredictivePolicing. The next type of predictive
policing is person-based, but not investigation driven.
For
example, Intrado's Beware software allows police to draw on
publicly available data, including social media data, to check the
"threat score" of a person or address as a 911 call comes in, and to
assign a label of green, yellow, or red, accordingly. 143 Other
systems analyze social media to automatically find gang
members. 144 Still other systems, like Chicago's "heat list," find the
likeliest people to be involved in an unspecified future crime. 145
The disparate impact harm stemming from racial imbalance in
these systems is different. These systems could lead to extra
monitoring of their subjects, and when a later crime occurs, police
might be more likely to look at them first. Or, if police respond to
a call with an erroneous "red" threat level, they might proceed
anxiously-with an itchy trigger finger-or otherwise be more
easily provoked into unnecessary force. Because the effects of
these systems are aimed at individuals, 146 the harm also looks

142

FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 3-7 (2006).

See Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: CalculatingYour Threat
'Score,' WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-n
ew-way-police-are-surveilling-you-calculating-your-threat-score2016/01/10/e42bccac.8e15
le
5-baf4-bdf37355da0cstory.html.
144 See, e.g., Lakshika Balasuriya et al., Finding Street Gang Members on Twitter 2016
143

IEEE/ACM INT'L CONF. ON ADVANCES IN Soc. NETWORKS ANALYSIS & MINING (ASONAM),

685, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.09516vl.pdf; Buntin, supra note 88.
145 See Buntin, supra note 88.
146 See id.
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different than the results of resource-management decisions
driven by crime-mapping. But some of the effects can be similar in
scale. As sociologist Sarah Brayne has documented, the Los
Angeles Police Department's person-based predictive policing uses
a simple points-based system, where more points means a person
is a greater threat. 147 To find "the worst of the worst," the LAPD
adds one point per police contact, leading to the very same type of
feedback loops that exist in place-based policing. 148 Over time, the
erroneous appearance of greater threat levels in minority
neighborhoods could also exacerbate an already adversarial
relationship with police and endanger lives as a result.
Just like mislabeled instances of crime in place-based systems,
the embedding of historically biased policing will teach the
algorithm that being a person of color makes one more likely to be
Beyond historical inaccuracies, person-based
a criminal.149
systems are likely to encounter more data collection pitfalls than
place-based systems. For example, when training an algorithm
with examples of people who have been shot and have not been
shot, the police have much more data on those who have been shot.
150
While this "class imbalance" is a fixable problem in principle,
care must be taken to ensure the representativeness of a much
larger class of people who have not been shot, so as to avoid
The
Social media data is also vulnerable.
sampling bias.
structural biases of the particular system the police extract data
from, whether Twitter, Facebook, or some other service, could
change the patterns of connections that are observed. 15 1 Whether
1 52
police attempt to extract a generalizable pattern of associations

147 See Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 977,
986-89 (2017).
1*6 Id. at 987 ("An individual having a high point value is predictive of future police
contact, and that police contact further increases the individual's point value.").
149 See id. at 997.
150 See Jason Brownlee, 8 Tactics to Combat Imbalanced Classes in Your Machine
Learning Dataset, MACHINE LEARNING MASTERY (Aug. 19, 2015), http://machinelearningma
stery.com/tactics-to-combat.imbalanced-classes-in-your-machine-learning-dataset/.
151 Zeynep Tufekci, Big Questions for Social Media Big Data: Representativeness, Validity
and Other Methodological Pitfalls, PROC. EIGHTH INT'L AAAI CONF. WEBLOGS & SOC.
MEDIA, 2014, at 505, 508, http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSMICWSM14/paper/view
File/8062/8151.
152 See Bachner, supra note 8, at 22-24.
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or perform a social media analysis, 153 such as with an attempt to
find gang members, 154 they have to understand the ways that the
social networking platform changes the data from what they might
expect to see in the offline world.
Feature selection is also more complicated with respect to
people rather than places. Representations of people in data are
necessarily reductive. As Toon Calders and Indre Zliobaite have
noted, "[i]t is often impossible to collect all the attributes of a
subject or take all the environmental factors into account with a
model."'5 5 Police may be tempted to use certain types of data-for
example, race, gender, neighborhood, or age-because it is easily
accessible. Choice of features would ideally not be made based on
cost or accessibility. Features that do not adequately capture the
relevant distinctions between people or locations will make the
predictions less accurate. But cost and convenience are common
factors in these decisions, and both can lead to discriminatory
15 6
outcomes.
3. Suspect-Based Predictive Policing. The final type of system
is suspect-based.
Suspect-based systems are the digital
descendants of offender profiling. They will be used to create a
model for what a person who might commit a particular crime
might look like, and then that model will be used to locate
suspects. 157 Though not yet commonly deployed-at least as far as
one can tell from public information-suspect-based predictive

153 See Somini Sengupta, In Hot Pursuitof Numbers to Ward Off Crime, N.Y. TIMES (June
19, 2013), http:/[bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/in-hot-pursuit-of-numbers-to-ward-off-cri
me/.
154 See Emerging Technology from the arXiv, How to Detect Criminal Gangs Using Mobile
Phone Data, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526471/ho
w-to-detect-criminal-gangs-using-mobile-phone-data/ (describing a software platform "that can
bring together information... to recreate detailed networks behind criminal organizations").
155 Toon Calders & Indr6 2liobaite, Why Unbiased ComputationalProcesses Can Lead to

DiscriminativeDecision Procedures, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION

SOCIETY 43, 47 (Bart Custers et al. eds., 2013).
156 See id. at 52 (noting that data features are often not collected because the "data is hard
to collect," which results in "overestimating the importance" of the features that are
collected).
157 See Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the
Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 876 (2016) (describing "Automated Suspicion
Algorithms" that "seek to predict individual criminality").
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policing systems will be here soon. 158 They are also the most
troubling of the three types.
Here, the harm is that racial disparities in the outcome of the
algorithm create a greater degree of suspicion and higher
likelihood of finding probable cause due to a suspect's race. While
the mechanisms of discrimination are similar to those above, it is
worth separating out suspect-based policing because it has most
vividly captured the imagination of those writing about predictive
policing, 159 and it is the most likely to respond to Fourth
Amendment oversight. That is because, unlike the prior two
methods, suspect-based policing would be used in service of an
investigation, which is the primary context in which the Fourth
Andrew Ferguson has pointed out
Amendment operates. 160
troubling difficulties with using the Fourth Amendment to address
Big Data-driven investigations,1 61 but at least it is not a total
conceptual mismatch.
C. BUT IS IT ALWAYS DISCRIMINATION?

While there are many ways an algorithm could be skewed in a
direction harmful to protected classes, the algorithm could also be
accurate and still have a disproportionate impact. The model
could have no data quality problems and "optimal" choices of
problem definitions and features, but still make determinations
primarily based on a trait or group of traits that, due to redundant
encodings, incidentally serves as a proxy for race. Here, the
algorithm would be rediscovering certain inequalities in society

168 See Ferguson, supra note 25, at 351; Rich, supra note 157, at 871-75, 878-79; see also
Reed E. Hundt, Making No Secrets About It, 10 ISJLP 581, 588 (2014) ("[G]overnment now
routinely asks computers to suggest who has committed crimes.").
159 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion:Automated Suspicion, Big
Data, and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POLy REV. 15, 28 (2016) (discussing "algorithms that
search for suspicious activity"); Rich, supra note 157, at 897 (discussing "automated
suspicion algorithms").
160 See Renan, supra note 33, at 1042-43 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does
not address programmatic surveillance because it is transactional-that is, focused on
individual moments in investigations); Meares, supra note 32, at 165 (noting that "the
constitutional framework is based on a one-off investigative incident').
161 See Ferguson, supra note 27, at 401-04 (explaining that using big data as a
justification to stop individuals will "undermin[e] the individualized and particularized
protections in the Fourth Amendment").

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss1/6

32

Selbst: Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing

2017]

DISPARATE IMPACT IN BIG DATA POLICING

141

that lead to disparate rates of crime among people of different
groups.
In this case, the very accuracy of the determination would cause
the racial disparity in output. 162 This leads to some difficult
questions. If there is a neighborhood or hot spot that truly does
have more crime, is it actually discriminatory to have more police
presence there? Is it even harmful? The communities in which
more crimes occur might welcome a greater police presence. Even
if they do not welcome it, though, it may not be "discriminatory,"
as we usually use the term. On the one hand, if police increase
their presence in communities that are already in bad shape, that
may increase the cycle of community disruption and poverty, and
exacerbate the extant criminal problem. 163 On the other hand, the
police are just doing their job. Even if there is agreement that
such a result is unfair, fixing it would require the police to make
less accurate determinations in order to racially rebalance the
Asking police to catch fewer criminals after
algorithm.1 64
conceding the accuracy of their algorithms would be a hard sell.
Nonetheless, there are reasons to be cautious about this
conclusion. First, it will often be difficult to observe a disparate
impact in the output of such a system and determine conclusively
whether it is actually a reflection of reality, or a function of the
various problems described above.1 65 Without some form of
1 66
perfectly omniscient data, this may be functionally impossible.
See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 692.
See Ferguson, supra note 76, at 230 ('The counterintuitive result is that a greater
police presence can, in fact, foster the social conditions that increase crime. Disrupting
existing social connections through arrest, incarceration, or intrusive surveillance causes
normal social connections break down.").
164 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 692 (noting that, because a "more precise form
of data mining will be more likely to capture disparate impact, police would have to utilize
less accurate data to resolve the problem").
165 See infra Part IV.A.
166 A group of computer scientists, recognizing that problems where good "ground truth"
data is available are fundamentally different from those where it is not, have proposed
different technical fairness measures for those situations. Where ground truth data is
available, they propose a measure called "disparate mistreatment" that aims to equalize error
rates of the prediction between groups. Muhammad Bilal Zafar et al., Fairness Beyond
Disparate Treatment & Disparate Impact: Learning Classification Without Disparate
Mistreatment, Proc. 26th Intl World Wide Web Conf. 1171, 1171 (2017). This is a better
measure because, once equalized, error rates are made an optimization constraint, and the
improvements in the algorithms will benefit everyone equally. But where ground truth data
does not exist or is untrustworthy, they advocate a return to the disparate impact
162
163
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Scholars and advocates have made this argument repeatedly.
They argue that, although police officers see arrest rates as gospel
167
about differing demographic crime rates, there is no such proof.
And as discussed in greater depth later, the realities of data
mining often make it impossible to tell whether the ultimate
source of discrimination is error or reality. 168 Thus, because the
claim that discrimination merely reflects reality may not be
sustainable, the "hard sell" might not turn out to be a realistic
scenario.
Second, even if there is no discrimination in the legal sense,
there is still a broader fairness argument to be made against the
result. If the algorithms are mere reflections of reality, then
another route to addressing crime is addressing the background
1 69
conditions of these communities that lead to increased crime.
Police need not use these systems solely for criminal enforcement.
For example, when the Chicago police rolled out plans for the
Strategic Subjects List, they claimed that it would lead at least
partly to the provision of social services. 170 This makes sense, as
71 If
the list predicts both victims and perpetrators of gun crime.1
the results of predictive policing are used to help those deemed
likely to be involved in future crime, as a preventative measure,
then even skewed data should not be thought of as discriminatory
because there is no harmful result. But the current evidence
demonstrates that rather than involving social services, "the
prevention strategy... was not well developed and only led to
increased contact with a group of people already in relatively
standard, id. at 1172, which in computer science means aiming equalize outcomes rather than
error rates within an acceptable margin of disparity.
167 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 116, at 75-78.
168 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 722; infra Part V.A.
169 See ROBINSON & KOEPKE, supra note 18, at 6 (suggesting that data could be used to
"track and reward strategies that do a better job of balancing a community's needs and
interests").
170 Id. at 9.
171 Id.
("According to one newspaper report, this was meant to be a carrot-and-stick
approach, where individuals on the list would be warned that 'further criminal activity,
even for the most petty offenses, will result in the full force of the law being brought down
on them... At the same time, police extend them an olive branch of sorts, an offer of help
obtaining a job or of social services.'" (quoting Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police Use 'Heat
List' as Strategy to Prevent Violence, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 21, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribun
e.com/2013-08-21/news/ct-met-heat-list-20130821_1-chicago-police-commander-andrew-pap
achristos-heat-list)).
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frequent contact with police." 172 A statement released by a
Consortium of Civil Rights groups stated, "[o]ther vital goals of
policing, such as building community trust, eliminating the use of
excessive force, and reducing other coercive tactics, are currently
173 This
not measured and not accounted for by these systems."
accords with Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson's observations
at the turn of the century that even efforts by social service
agencies "wedded to a welfarist ideology of service delivery" were
later "drawn into the harder edge of social control."1 74 As Sarah
Brayne similarly observed, "regardless of the reason they were
kept in the first place, data and records are increasingly integrated
and deployed by law enforcement agencies for a broad range of
1' 75
surveillance purposes.
If police see their job as surveilling and arresting criminals, and
see predictive policing as merely a way to identify them or
determine places and times at which they can arrest them, then
1 76
these systems will produce the unfair results described above,
even when accurate. But this need not be the way predictive
policing is used. Rachel Harmon has argued that police usually
define their job by" arrests, but that such an extreme focus on
arrests has unexamined and unjustified costs. 177 Arguing that
police should have less discretion to arrest, she writes that "[i]f
more people can, through a less discretionary process, be released
with only a low increase in failures to appear and reoffending,
17 8 Though
then broad discretion to arrest is no longer justified."
she does not discuss predictive policing, this idea of detecting risk
is the central purpose of predictive policing technology. If the
technology is genuinely demonstrating facts about current reality,
then aiming to change that reality rather than perpetuating it
through arrest is the fairer result.

172

Saunders et al., supra note 18, at 363.

173 STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS, supranote 20.

174 Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J. SOC.
605, 611 (2000).
175 Sarah Brayne, Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and
InstitutionalAttachment, 79 AM. SOc. REV. 367, 371 (2014).
176 See supra notes 172-82 and accompanying text.
177 See Rachel A- Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 313-20 (2016).
178 Id. at 354.
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III. THE FAILURES OF STANDARD ACCOUNTABILITY TOOLS

While data mining has the ability to be superior to police
hunches and reduce discriminatory results, police cannot simply
trust that their analytics are accomplishing those tasks. And just
as police cannot trust their tools not to be discriminatory, society
cannot merely trust police to know or care. The adoption of new,
potentially harmful policing tools must be regulated somehow:
But our standard modes of regulation are not working. Typically,
police are regulated through the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, but neither has much to say about unintentional
discrimination.
Even if they did, or a hypothetical antidiscrimination law was passed, it would pose its own challenges.
Thus, before Part IV proposes a new model of regulation to address
the potential for discrimination in predictive policing, this Part
explains why the current models fail.
A. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROVIDE THE ANSWER

If the police arrest a person on the recommendation of a
suspect-based predictive policing algorithm, the arrestee might
hope that the Fourth Amendment can provide a solution. The
arrest would go something like this: police are driving down the
street, running a facial recognition program to identify people, 179
and then running those names through their algorithms based on
publicly available data to see who matches a profile. Once they
find a match, they arrest the person on suspicion of whatever
crime they are looking to solve. This scenario is a quintessential
Fourth Amendment problem.
Andrew Ferguson has argued that such an arrest would not
raise Fourth Amendment concerns on its own. 8 0 Yet the Fourth
Amendment is the primary tool for police regulation in American

179

See Clare Garvie et al., The PerpetualLine-Up: UnregulatedPolice Face Recognition in

America, GEORGETOWN CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.perpetualline

up.org.
180 See Ferguson, supra note 25, at 330 (describing a hypothetical scenario using facial
recognition software in which the police attain "particularized, individualized suspicion
about a man who is not doing anything overtly criminal").

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss1/6

36

Selbst: Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing

2017]

DISPARATE IMPACT IN BIG DATA POLICING

145

law. 8 1 Thus, it is worth pushing a little further to ask a slightly
different question: Could the Fourth Amendment be implicated if
the algorithm was shown to have racially disparate results? An
arrestee in the above scenario might argue that he was
unreasonably searched or seized because the police methods were
discriminatory or that the reliance on race implies a lack of
individualized suspicion. Person-based tools have a more tenuous
connection to the Fourth Amendment because even if a person is
watched more closely, that should, in theory, be separate from the
facts leading to probable cause. And place-based tools used for
resource management will not create a Fourth Amendment
concern, because those tools are not related to investigations.
But it turns out that the Fourth Amendment will not address
the potential harms identified in Part II. Nor will the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it does
not protect against disparate impact. 8 2 The standard strategies
for constitutional regulation of the police are therefore ill-suited to
address disparate impact caused by predictive policing.
1. Race and the Fourth Amendment. Discussions of race and
the Fourth Amendment usually begin with Whren v. United
States, 8 3 a 1996 case holding that the subjective motives of police
officers, including racial bias, do not invalidate an otherwise
lawful stop. 8 4 In Whren, a police officer stopped two black men in
an SUV in a "high drug area" of Washington D.C., and found drugs
in the car. 8 5 Moving to suppress the evidence, the defendants
argued that a reasonable police officer would not have stopped
them for the stated reasons, and that those reasons were mere
pretext for a racially motivated stop. 8 6 The Court did not care.
Because the defendants sped off at an "unreasonable" speed, the
officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had
occurred and that was the end of the inquiry. 8 7 As long as the
181 Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 785 (2012)
("[Alccording to legal scholars, the Constitution continues to be the primary means for
regulating the police.").
182 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976).
18- 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
184 See id. at 813.
185 Id. at 808-09.
186

187

Id. at 809.
Id. at 810.
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officers "could have" stopped the car for a traffic violation, it was
irrelevant why they actually stopped the car.188 No matter that
because the police could always find probable cause for a traffic
violation, it would be trivial for officers to stop someone on account
of his race.1 8 9 While the Court "of course agree[d] with petitioners
that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law
based on considerations such as race," it held that petitioners
should make their claims under the Equal Protection Clause.190
In light of Whren, "scholars have written off the Fourth
Amendment as a basis for challenging racially motivated searches
and seizures."1 91 But unintentional data-driven discrimination
complicates the picture. In a sense, Whren was not actually a case
about race. It held that probable cause was to be measured by an
objective standard and that subjective motivations did not factor
in.1 92 When the Whren Court mentioned race, it held that "the
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory
application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment."1 93 The problems of discrimination in data mining,
however, are not those of motive, conscious or unconscious. When
police rely on a machine for their suspicion detection, the officers
using the program are not even being subconsciously racist. 94 The
people creating the model-as opposed to those using it-are more
directly responsible for the discriminatory outcome, but neither
are they likely to be relying, even unconsciously, on racial
stereotypes.1 95
The conventional wisdom is actually more dismissive than the
doctrine. As Devon Carbado summarized: "[F]or purposes of

188 Id. at 809 (citing United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). This
could be contrasted with the "would have" justification-"whether a police officer, acting
reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given." Id. at 810.
189 Id. at 812.
190 Id. at 813.
191 Thompson, supra note 39, at 960-61.
192 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
193 Id. (emphasis added).

See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 698-700.
195Cf. id. at 699 ("For example, the person who came up with the idea for Street Bump
ultimately devised a system that suffers from reporting bias, but it was not because he or
she was implicitly employing some racial stereotype. Rather, it was simply inattentiveness
to problems with the sampling frame." (footnote omitted)).
19
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Fourth Amendment law, race does not matter."196 Kevin Johnson
explained: "It may seem surprising to most readers, but the use of
racial profiling by law enforcement authorities in the United
States has long been permitted and encouraged, if not expressly
97
authorized, by U.S. constitutional law."
The commentary surrounding Whren has contributed to this
perception. Whren was decided in the midst of then-emerging
social science and cognitive psychology research into unconscious
bias. 198 Humans categorize and stereotype in order to more
quickly process information, and racial stereotypes are no
different. 199 Anthony Thompson summarized this phenomena as
follows: "As the human mind seeks to understand conduct, it looks
to salient cues, such as race and ethnicity, and then draws on
culturally embedded understandings to evaluate behavior." 200 The
unconscious bias research demonstrates that no individual police
officer could separate his thoughts about what looks like probable
cause from his views about the correlations between racial,
cultural, and gender identity and criminality. 20 1 Techniques like
196 Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1033
(2002). Paul Butler was even more explicit: The Fourth Amendment is "a project by the
Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts to expand the power of the police against people of
color." Paul Butler, The White FourthAmendment, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 246 (2010).
197 Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land:
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly
Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1006 (2010).
198 See Thompson, supra note 39, at 987-88 (describing research published almost
concurrently with the Whren decision demonstrating that "negative attitudes towards
African Americans create a perceptual norm of viewing African Americans as more prone to
criminal conduct").
199 See id. at 983.
200 Id. at 983-84.
201 See id. at 986-87 (noting that "police officers often proceed on the basis of 'traits' that,
they assert, correlate with criminal behavior"). Discrimination scholarship around the
same time was very focused on unconscious bias. Charles Lawrence, Linda Krieger, and
many others were all examining the effects of unconscious bias and the Implicit Association
Test (IAT) for anti-discrimination law. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1177 (1995) (arguing that Title VII jurisprudence is
inadequate to address unconscious bias); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987)
(explaining that an individual's unconscious biases "seem part of the individual's rational
ordering of her perceptions of the world"). As Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein observed,
"[t]he scholarly literature critiquing existing antidiscrimination law, both constitutional and
statutory, for its general failure to address the problem of implicit bias is voluminous."
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 978
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the Implicit Association Test and other reaction-time based
instruments have demonstrated that even people who vehemently
believe they are anti-racist exhibit unconscious biases, 20 2 including
an association between race and criminality. 2 3 Because all
20 4
humans exhibit unconscious bias, so too will all police officers.
The fact of unconscious bias is well enough understood that the
use of seemingly neutral technology to take the decisions out of
human hands is seen as a good thing. 20 5 This is why data mining
is often sold as a way to reduce disparate outcomes.
After Whren, scholars such as Anthony Thompson argued that
the case was the culmination of a broad, mistaken turn toward
colorblindness in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 20 6 Thompson
traced a history of Supreme Court decisions, beginning with Terry
v. Ohio,20 7 which constructed the narrative of a neutral,
experienced police officer, "unaffected by considerations of race
and who could be trusted even in a race-laden case like Terry to be
acting on the basis of legitimate indicia of criminal activity. ' '20 8 In
Terry, Detective McFadden's elephant-in-the-room testimony that

n.45 (2006) (collecting sources); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske,
Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate
Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1003 n.21 (2006) (collecting sources).
202 See Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness:Implicit Bias and the
Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 473 (2010).
203 See Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty
Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 190 (2010) (finding that subjects of a
study held implicit associations between black people and the status of being guilty).
204 See Tracey G. Gove, Implicit Bias and Law Enforcement, THE POLICE CHIEF, Oct. 2011,
at 44, 50 ("Police officers are human and, as the theory contends, may be affected by
implicit biases just as any other individual. In other words, well-intentioned officers who
err may do so not as a result of intentional discrimination, but because they have what has
been proffered as widespread human biases.").
205 See, e.g., Ellen Huet, Rise of the Bias Busters: How Unconscious Bias Became Silicon
Valley's Newest Target, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/
11/02/rise-of-the-bias-busters-how-unconscious-bias-became-slicon-valleys-newest-target.
206 Thompson, supra note 39, at 981; see also, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 43 (1999); Lenese C. Herbert, Bate
Noire: How Race-Based Policing Threatens National Security, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 149, 180
(2003) ("The Court has chosen ... to view official action under the Fourth Amendment
colorblind eye, side-stepping the pervasiveness of law enforcement that is race-based."). See
generally Ian F. Haney Ldpez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1064-66 (2010) (criticizing
colorblindness in the criminal justice system more generally).
207 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
208 Thompson, supra note 39, at 971.
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he was "unable to say precisely"20 9 what drew his eye to the black
defendants became "a highly skilled officer's instinctive
assessment that something in the situation seemed awry and
worthy of investigation. '2 10
As Thompson explained, "[s]uch
narratives permit the judges to clarify the events in their own
minds and to present the facts and law in a manner that the legal
2 11
community will generally accept."
Before the rise of data-driven decision-making, conscious and
unconscious human biases were the only possible sources of
discrimination at the point of the decision. Thus, stating that the
Fourth Amendment did not consider race was a clean and accurate
21 2
shorthand, and it has become the dominant understanding.
This makes it highly unlikely, if theoretically possible, that a
sympathetic judge will dig deep into the doctrine to find a Fourth
Amendment violation due to disparate impact in suspect-based or
person-based predictive policing.
This low likelihood is
compounded by the unavailability of disparate impact in equal
protection doctrine, which suggests that the Constitution as a
whole is not amenable to disparate impact as a theory.
2. Individualized Suspicion as a Disparate Impact Substitute.
Arguably, the Fourth Amendment does not handle discrimination
well because race was never meant to be its core concern. The
Fourth Amendment does, however, address one form of racial
bias-straightforward racial profiling. It can do so because of its
individualized suspicion requirement. 21 3
Under the Fourth
Amendment, police must have probable cause to effect a search or
seizure, which includes a requirement that the cause be tied
specifically to the person searched or things or people seized.2 1 4 As
Terry, 392 U.S. at 5 (quoting the detective's testimony).
Thompson, supra note 39, at 969.
211 Id.
at 968-69 (footnotes omitted).
212 See id. at 973 (arguing that "the Court's treatment of racial motivation" in Terry
"established a pattern that would continue in the Court's subsequent Fourth Amendment
cases").
213 See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment "generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent
individualized suspicion").
214 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (probable cause requires "a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt... and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect
to the person to be searched or seized" (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ybarra v.
linois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979))).
209
210
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Andrew Taslitz put it, "individualized suspicion is the beating
'
heart that gives probable cause its vitality. "215
In the case of strict racial profiling, the individualized suspicion
requirement serves as a proxy to prevent racially biased stops and
searches. A person that is stopped on account of her race is not
stopped for any reason demonstrating suspicion particular to her.
But given the intentional nature of a racially profiled stop, it looks
more like disparate treatment than disparate impact. 216 In racial
profiling, race is the single--or dominant-factor in a stop
whereas, if a suspect is stopped due to a data mining system with
discriminatory outcomes, race will potentially be one of many
2 17
factors (whether used implicitly or explicitly).
Although case law hints that individualized suspicion could be
repurposed to address the unique challenges posed by predictive
policing, it will not work. But it is useful to understand why.
Racial profiling is merely a special case of non-individualization
that judges are attuned to. The requirements for a data mining
system to become more individualized, and thus satisfy the Fourth
Amendment, are orthogonal to discrimination; increases in the
individualization of a model may unpredictably increase or
decrease the disparate impact of the output.
a. Race and Individualizationin the Case Law. The Supreme
Court has drawn connections between individualization and
discrimination, noting in the employment discrimination context
"that Title VII requires employers to treat their employees as
individuals, not 'as simply components of a racial, religious,
One major reason the Fourth
sexual, or national class.' '"218
Amendment requires individualized suspicion, and rejects broad
surveillance, is to prevent the unbridled discretion that would
21 9
allow for discrimination.
215 Andrew E. Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The Costs,
Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
2010, at 145, 145; see also id. (" 'Individualized suspicion,' the United States Supreme Court
has suggested, is perhaps the most important of the four components of probable cause.").
216 See, e.g., Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769, 1784 (2016) (discriminatory intent is the
"defining element" of disparate treatment).
217 See supra Part II.C.
218 Ariz. Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983) (quoting City of Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978)).
219 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 5-6 (1997); Joh, supra note 159, at
28; see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("By
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In 2013, Floyd v. City of New York 22 0-the famous stop-andfrisk case-demonstrated how a judge could treat a racial bias
problem as a lack of individualized suspicion. Floyd involved a
challenge to a New York Police Department program of routine
stops and frisks, primarily in minority neighborhoods. 221 The case
addressed a pattern of 4.4 million stops over an eight-year period,
as well as nineteen stops of twelve individual plaintiffs. 222 Judge
Scheindlin found that the program was racially biased and
violated both the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection
223
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Importantly, Judge Scheindlin located the racial discrimination
harms in the Fourteenth Amendment, but only found that the
Fourth Amendment was violated due to the officers' repeated stops
without individualized reasonable suspicion, even though the two
224
violations stemmed from the same conduct.
In the equal protection discussion, Judge Scheindlin found that
the city intentionally discriminated, based on testimony that the
policy required stopping "the right people," a term which was
racially coded. 225 She also noted: "The NYPD's policy of targeting
'the right people' . . . is not directed toward the identification of a
specific perpetrator. Rather, it is a policy of targeting expressly
226
identified racial groups for stops in general."
In the discussion of individual stops, Judge Scheindlin found
several examples where reasonable suspicion was lacking because
the only evidence was the race of the plaintiff and one or two other
indicators that were not suggestive of criminality. Of one plaintiff,
requiring reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to such seizures, the Fourth Amendment
protects innocent persons from being subjected to 'overbearing or harassing police conduct
carried out solely on the basis of imprecise stereotypes of what criminals look like, or on the
basis of irrelevant personal characteristics such as race.").
220 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
221 See id. at 556.
222 Id. at 556, 561.
223 Id. at 562.
224 Id. at 562, 660-61 (noting that the "individual stop testimony corroborated much of the
evidence about the NYPD's policies and practices'). Judge Scheindlin even began the
discussion by quoting Whren for a statement that seems to mean the opposite of what
people assume it stands for: 'The Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law
based on considerations such as race." Id. at 660 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 813 (1996)).
225 Id. at 662-63.
226 Id. at 664 (footnote omitted).
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she wrote: "Even if credited, Almonor's alleged furtive
movements-looking over his shoulder and jaywalking-in
combination with the generic description of young black male does
not establish the requisite individualized suspicion that Almonor
was engaged in criminal activity."227 These findings about the
individual plaintiffs demonstrate that, when police rely in large
part on race to justify the suspicion necessary for a stop, the stop
can violate the Fourth Amendment for being insufficiently
individualized. Judge Scheindlin was able to find violations of the
Equal Protection Clause in the individual cases as well, but
consistent with the doctrine, they were an entirely separate
discussion located outside of the Fourth Amendment. 228 In both
holdings, the equal protection and individualization issues were
clearly linked, but because of the structure of the Fourth
Amendment, they had to be analyzed separately.
The Fourth Amendment's focus on individualization also
explains treatment of race elsewhere in the doctrine. In two cases,
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce229 and United States v. MartinezFuerte,230 the Supreme Court addressed "perceived Mexican
ancestry" in the context of border searches. 231 The Court ruled that
perceived Mexican ancestry could be a factor in the decision of
whether to stop drivers "for brief inquiry into their residence
status,"232 but it could not be the only factor. 233 By stating that

Id. at 630. Discussing another plaintiff, she noted that his
"[P]resence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not
enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is
committing a crime." ... This, combined with the vague description of
"black males" and the entirely unsuspicious act of putting one's hands in
one's pockets in the wintertime, is a far cry from the individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing that constitutes reasonable suspicion. Absent any
other justification, there was no basis for a Terry stop, and there was
certainly no basis to believe that McDonald was armed and dangerous.
Id. at 632-33 (quoting minois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)).
228 See, e.g., id. at 633. Judge Scheindlin arguably could have gone further with data
analysis than she did, but she did not have to because she was able to rely on damaging
statements by the police department itself, a kind of evidence not available in most cases.
Sharad Goel et al., CombattingPolice Discriminationin the Age of Big Data,20 NEW CRIM.
L. REV. 181, 187 (2017).
229 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
2-0 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
231 See Brignoni.Ponce,422 U.S. 874-75; Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 545.
232 Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 555.
227
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race could not be the only factor, the Court removed the possibility
of pure racial profiling and returned the question to a totality-ofthe-circumstances determination of individualized suspicion. 234
This comports with the separate and widespread intuition that it
would be absurd to exclude a suspect's race from visual
descriptions. 2 5 Race as an identifier is acceptable if it sits
alongside other factors. Accordingly, though "[c]ontesting the
existence of reasonable articulable suspicion is a roundabout way
of challenging police discrimination,"236 it is worth asking if it is a
237
viable one.
But despite these links, individualization and discrimination
are not tightly interconnected concepts. Disparate impact does not
concern individual treatment, but rather it concerns unfair
treatment on account of class membership. 238 If police cast more
suspicion on someone because that person is of a certain race, that
is unfair, but is it any less individualized than other observations?
To answer that question it is important to have a fuller account of
individualization in general, which is a surprisingly slippery
concept.
233 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87.
That these cases could have been considered
instances of disparate treatment rather than disparate impact merely underscores the point
that individualized suspicion has traction where race does not.
234 Cf. Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction of Recidivism, 26 FED.
SENT'G REP. 167, 170 (2014) ('Race, ethnicity, and religion are not to my knowledge
anywhere used as an explicit factor in prediction instruments or in sentencing or parole
policies. However, the use of any of them likely would be upheld, as it was in the profiling
cases, so long as it was only one among several factors.').
235 See, e.g., David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction,No, 73 MISS.
L.J. 423, 449 (2003) ("[R]ace is one of the most important physical characteristics of a
criminal that one could include in this description .... Such an unchangeable, highly
visible trait has real value in accurately describing the suspect.").
236 Goel et al., supranote 228, at 196.
237 A side benefit of the focus on individualization is that Whren is not implicated because
probable cause itself is challenged. Whren only states that where there is an otherwise
valid reason for the stop, an additional invalid reason cannot matter. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996). But under the individualization theory, the valid reason
does not exist.
238 See,
e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (2006) (discussing anti-discrimination
law in terms of "unfairness"); George 0. Luce, Why DisparateImpact Claims Should Not Be
Allowed Under the Federal Employer Provisions of the ADEA, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 440
(2004) ("[I]isparate impact theory was created as a form of strict liability that
targets unfair results, without regard to the employer's motivation or intent.').
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b. The Real Meaning of Individualization. Individualized
suspicion is at the core of the Fourth Amendment's probable cause
requirement. As the Supreme Court has described the constraint,
"belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to
be searched or seized." 239 But that high-level statement hides a
great deal of confusion and disagreement about both the practical
meaning of individualization and the normative rationale for it.240
Intuitively, there seems to be a binary distinction between
Generalized
individualized and generalized observations.
number of
great
a
to
apply
stereotypes,
including
observations,
probably
are
jackets
red
people. For example: "People who wear
part of a gang." Conversely, individualized observations concern a
single person: "He visited a known drug den." But when the police
identify a person and stop him, the line between individual and
general suddenly disappears.
Consider observations about Alice and Bob. Alice is seen
wearing a red jacket. Bob is seen visiting a known, drug den. The
police stop both. Alice was stopped because the police know that
239 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91
(1979)).
240 See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461, 464 (2015) ('The purpose of
individualization is to minimize hassle. Hassle is the chance the police will stop or search
an innocent person against his will."); see also Crespo, supra note 28, at 2102 (noting that
"what is probable cause?" is one of the foundational constitutional criminal law questions
the Court has left unanswered for decades). Many scholars have attempted to address the
question, but few have done so satisfyingly. Several related questions have arisen around
individualization. For example, can or should probable cause be quantified? Compare Orin
Kerr, Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 112 (Michael Kiarman et al. eds., 2012) (arguing against quantifying
probable cause), with Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause
Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 790-91 (2013) (arguing in favor of quantifying
probable cause in light of police officers' increased reliance on technology that itself relies on
probability and quantification). Can machines do what human police officers do? See
generally Kerr, supra; see also Rich, supra note 157, at 897 (noting that Automated
Suspicion Algorithms "are fundamentally incapable" of engaging in a totality-of-thecircumstances analysis); Taslitz, supra note 215, at 167 ("A computer-like set of 'if-then'
rules for all police conduct is neither feasible nor wise."); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, 'Plausible
Cause": Explanatory Standards in the Age of Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249,
1298-1300 (2017) (arguing that machines cannot do the robust analytical work that
humans do). But see generally Andrew D. Selbst, A Mild Defense of Our New Machine
Overlords, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 87 (2017) (arguing that machines can provide some of
the explanations that humans do, and should not be dismissed). Ultimately, if the answer to
either of the last two questions is "no," then predictive policing based on data mining should
simply be outlawed under the Fourth Amendment.
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wearing a red jacket is a sign of being involved in gang activity. In
order to connect the generalized statement about gangs to a
particular individual, the officers made an observation about that
individual-that Alice was wearing a red jacket. This piece of
information is individualized in the exact same sense as Bob's
observed choice to walk into a drug den-both relied on
information about the individual. The complete syllogism is:
(1) Alice was wearing a red jacket; (2) people who wear red jackets
are probably part of a gang; and (3) therefore, Alice is probably
part of gang. The police compared an observation about Alice to a
known fact about the world, and then deduced that Alice was
likely involved in criminal activity.
Bob's stop demonstrates the symmetry in reasoning. Simply
noticing that Bob walked into a known drug den does not say
anything about whether Bob was committing a crime. An extra
step is needed and, in this case, it is just hidden: (1) Bob visited a
known drug den; (2) people who visit drug dens are probably
involved in criminal activity; and (3) therefore, Bob is probably
involved in criminal activity.
In reality, neither of these factual scenarios is likely enough to
stop Alice or Bob without more information. 24 1 There is nothing
suggesting Alice is doing anything wrong at the moment-it is
inconceivable that wearing a red jacket is, alone, enough to
indicate criminal activity-and Bob could have been delivering a
pizza. But what's important here is that the structure of the
reasoning in both cases is identical. In both cases, police observed
an innocent fact about a person, compared it to a general fact that
connects the observed characteristic with crime, and used the
comparison to add suspicion to that person. Both fact patterns
used individualized and generalized information, and neither
could have made any headway in assessing likelihood of criminal
activity without reference to both. The basic structure of this
reasoning applies in every case. Thus, there is no such thing as a
truly individualized decision. 242 As Jane Bambauer puts it: "Cases
241 See Ferguson, supra note 27, at 388 ("Knowing someone is a 'drug dealer' does not
mean that the individual is actively dealing drugs at the moment of observation.").
242 See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE

AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 40 (2007) ("[T]he distinction between individualized and
generalized suspicion is, in all relevant respects, meaningless.'). The two scholars most
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can be unique in the sense that they involve one-of-a-kind
combinations of factors, but the reasoning of a case cannot be
unique."

243

This observation should not, however, be surprising. It is the
very reason data mining works. Data mining operates on the
understanding that a data subject's likely outcome for some query
is similar to those people with whom the subject shares relevant
attributes. 244 To discover something about a person, a data miner
compares that person to everyone else that is like him in some
specified way. 245 A data miner can add variables and make the
model more accurate, but the fundamentals of the process remain
unchanged.
Suppose that instead of the connection between red jackets and
gangs, the police department had a model that predicted the
likelihood of criminality based on jacket color, hairstyle,
neighborhood, web surfing habits, and credit profile. Call it
Model M. The reasoning surrounding Alice's stop would look the
same. Now the syllogism is as follows:
(1) Alice wore a red jacket, has short hair, lives in a
certain neighborhood, primarily browses the internet

diametrically opposed on the importance of individual determinations, Andrew Taslitz and
Frederick Schauer, believe, respectively, that humans are unique and should be identified
as such, Taslitz, supra note 215, at 158-59, and that only aggregated generalizations
matter, SCHAUER, supra note 142, at 68-69, 106 ("[I]ndividualized analysis is simply an
aggregate of stereotypes .... ). But even they ultimately agree that "reasoning without
some generalizations is impossible" and that "there is a spectrum of relative generality
versus specificity." Taslitz, supra note 215, at 161.
After realizing that truly individualized suspicion is a myth, several scholars have
concluded that individualized analysis should be wholly abandoned. Christopher Slobogin
has proposed a proportionality principle for the probability side of the question, arguing
that because we cannot individualize, we need to tighten our rules about probabilistic
requirements into better-defined tiers than just probable cause and reasonable suspicion, so
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth
as to further constrain search.
Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 68-75 (1991). Similarly, Bernard Harcourt and Tracey
Meares have pivoted from the lack of pure individualization to argue for randomized
searches akin to checkpoints as the very basis for reasonableness in search. Bernard
Harcourt & Tracey Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
809, 850 (2011). Whether they are ultimately correct or not, individualization remains a
central part of the case law, so it is worth exploring further.
m Bambauer, supra note 240, at 471.
244 See Fayyad, supra note 84.
245 See id.
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after midnight on her computer, and has a middling
credit score; (2) people with red jackets and short hair
that live in Alice's neighborhood, web surf after
midnight, and have middling credit scores are often in
gangs; and (3) therefore, Alice is probably in a gang.
This is much closer to what a predictive policing algorithm would
look like because it uses multiple variables. Nevertheless, the
addition of more variables did not fundamentally change the
syllogism: (1) Person X is a member of Set S; (2) people in Set S
probably have trait T; and (3) therefore, Person X probably has
246
trait T.
c. Individualization Will Not Prevent DisparateImpact. It is
now possible to see the important difference between racial
profiling and discriminatory predictive policing. The syllogism
required for pure racial profiling takes the form: (1) Charlie is
black; (2) black people are more likely to be criminals; (3)
therefore, Charlie is more likely to be a criminal. No judge can
permit a search based on this syllogism because of the second
step-the racist generalization. But data mining adds more
factors, potentially many more. Where the description of the
subject includes more factors, the automatic rejection of the
generalization step dissipates. Instead, the analysis looks like
Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte, where Mexican heritage
247
could permissibly be one factor, but not the only one.
The conceptual clash goes even deeper. Just because nothing can
be perfectly individualized does not mean that individualization is
It is possible to think of
itself a meaningless concept.
individualization as a spectrum from "smaller generalizations" to
are more
smaller generalizations
"larger ones," where
8
24
As Andrew Taslitz has observed, for the purposes
individualized.
246 See K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make
Sense of Data,5 COLUM. Sci.& TECH. L. REV. 2, 22 (2003).
247 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975) ('The likelihood that
any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican
appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not justify stopping all MexicanAmericans to ask if they are aliens.'); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563
n.16 (1976) (citing a statistic suggesting only a small percentage of motorists of Mexican
ancestry are stopped at the border to support the proposition that race is not the only factor
used in making stops).
248 See SCHAUER, supra note 142, at 68-69; Taslitz, supra note 215, at 157.
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of the Fourth Amendment, the "practical question is where, as a
matter of wise policy, to place ourselves on [the] continuum" from
generalized to individualized decisionmaking. 24 9 In the context of
data mining, while it may not be possible to define "individualized"
in an absolute way, it is still coherent to speak of a model that is
more or less individualized than another. In those terms, if a model
is individualized enough, it satisfies the Fourth Amendment. For
the purposes of discrimination, the question is whether increasing
individualization in order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment will
ameliorate or exacerbate discriminatory outcomes.
In a data mining model, a more individualized system will be
able to make determinations-whether positive or negative-about
fewer people overall. Thus, there are two aspects of a trained data
mining model that can individualize it. More features could be
observed, or the data collected could be more granular. 2 0 Adding
features is the difference between "red jacket" Alice and "Model M'
Alice. The set of people who look like Alice in Model M-that is,
wear red jackets, have short hair, live in Alice's neighborhood, web
surf after midnight, and have middling credit scores-is a subset
of the people who wear red jackets. By including more features, a
model can return a prediction that is keyed more specifically to an
individual. It is a "smaller generalization. '25 1 The same is true of
more granular data. For example, if the location data exists at the

Taslitz, supra note 215, at 161.
While additional or more granular features in training data individualize a model,
these narrowing criteria are only useful if the information about a suspect includes enough
data to take advantage of the additional comparison points. If "black male" is all that is
entered into the algorithm, the algorithm will output an average result for all black males,
even if the model has been trained on more specific information. Thus, a third practical
requirement for more individualized decisions is to use more available data about the
subject.
251 See SCHAUER, supra note 142, at 68. There is one important caveat.
Each of the
additional features attached to the suspect must actually add to the suspicion. If red
jackets indicate gang membership at the same rate as someone that matches Alice's profile
in Model M, then none of the other factors in Model M are doing any work. And if red
jacket-based suspicion is only a New York phenomenon, then the location is no longer doing
any work. If the entire determination can be explained by a subset of the total variables,
then the determination is only as individualized as the greatest number of people that the
subset of variables applies to.
249
250
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neighborhood level, rather than the city level, fewer252people are
implicated in any result, whether positive or negative.
This formulation explains the acceptance of using race as an
identifying factor, as long as it is only one of several factors. 253 In
the cases where race adds suspicion, it is in a sense no different
than identifying someone by their red jacket from the perspective
of the Fourth Amendment's individualized suspicion standard. If
a person is identified by race in a physical description, it becomes
relevant. If a person is of "apparent Mexican ancestry" near the
border, as in Martinez-Fuerte,2 4 it makes him more likely to be
present illegally, as a matter of sheer statistics. But race is a
factor that applies to all people, most of them innocent.
Accordingly, race alone is insufficient to individualize the inquiry,
and more features are necessary.
Thus, adding features or making them more granular makes
the model more individualized. Those new features, however, will
suffer from the same biases of the features that make up the model
in the first place. 255 The data corresponding to those features
could be of lower quality, unrepresentative, or mislabeled, and
thus skew the output to be more or less discriminatory. Similar
effects can be observed with respect to data granularity. Going
from city, to neighborhood, to hotspot or "high crime area" could
either increase or decrease disparate impact. 256 Thus, adding
features and increasing granularity is just as likely to exacerbate
262 This mathematical perspective on individualization also explains much of the case law,
which requires adding variables in the human systems of observation. As Jane Bambauer
notes: "When assessing an officer's decision to stop or search somebody, courts prefer to
receive a long list of reasons justifying the decision. The more reasons the agent can
recount, the better." Bambauer, supra note 240, at 496. This is because "[a]dding factors to
the Venn diagram has an exclusionary effect" and "[c]ourts are reassured by longer lists of
justifications because these lists roughly signal that the agent's model cannot scale to a
large number of people, many of whom may be innocent." Id. at 497.
253 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975).
24 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976).
265 See supra Part H.B.
256 See Adam Benforado, The Geography of Criminal Law, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 823, 846-

48 (2010) ("Grow up on the wrong side of town, and your chances of ending up in the back of
a squad car increase dramatically."); Ferguson, supra note 76, at 217 (describing the
correlation between "high-crime areas," "low income communities," and "communities of
color"); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660-61, 676-78 (1994) (explaining that Terry stops
are applied "disproportionately to poor, to African Americans, and to Hispanic Americans"
because these groups are the most likely to live in "high crime areas").
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disparate impact as it is to reduce it, and there is no way to tell
beforehand whether increased individualization will lead to better
257
or worse outcomes for members of various protected classes.
In sum, the Fourth Amendment will not provide a regulatory
solution. According to many scholars, the Fourth Amendment as a
regulatory tool is mistakenly colorblind at best, and outright racist
at worst. 258 Claims of disparate impact will likely fall on the deaf
ears of judges who intrinsically understand the Fourth
Amendment this way.
Individualization will not serve as a
substitute for a disparate impact claim because increasing
individualization in data mining models is at cross-purposes with
the reduction of disparate impact, and racial profiling is truly a
special case.
B. THE FAILURE OF THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LIABILITY MODEL

Lacking a constitutional response, an answer must come in
some form of legislation. Because the problem is disparate impact,
the obvious approach would be a law modeled on existing antidiscrimination laws, such as Title VII. But the discrimination in
data mining systems confounds the typical model of antidiscrimination regulation. Barocas and I explained why this is the
case for Title VII in a prior work, 259 but here I expand the
argument to laws modeled on an anti-discrimination framework
257 Reintroducing humans to the process does not solve the problem either. Ric Simmons
and Michael Rich have both suggested that, while data mining should be part of the overall
suspicion-generation process, it should only be used in conjunction with human policing.
See Rich, supra note 157, at 983 ("[A] person trained in making individualized suspicion
determinations must be the final assessor of the totality-of-the-circumstances, including
both the ASA's prediction and any other relevant available data ..
"); Simmons, supra
note 52, at 991 ("A human being at least has the potential to incorporate new observations,
but a predictive algorithm is limited by its previous programming."). In these proposals,
predictive algorithms become similar to any other direct observations of suspicious
behavior, after which the police use their discretion to decide whether to act. But such a
process only serves to double the sources of disparate impact. Not only will the effects of
the algorithms' disparate impact go unrecognized by police and be treated as a neutral fact,
but the discretion 'that the "neutral algorithm" is supposed to solve again becomes a part of
the overall decision.
258 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 196, at 246; Carbado, supra note 196, at 967-68; David A.
Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and
Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 550-53 (1997); Maclin, supra
note 38, at 338.
259 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 715.
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more generally. The lessons from this regulatory strategy's failure
will, in turn, inform the features a new regulatory scheme should
possess.
1. Beyond Title VII. There are three parts to a disparate
impact case. First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing
of disproportionate impact from a defendant's decision on a
protected class. 260 Second, if the plaintiff succeeds, then the
burden shifts to the defendant to make a showing of "business
necessity."26 1 In Title VII, this essentially amounts to a showing
that the decision is "job related," 26 2 but it can be generalized to a
requirement of fitness for the purpose-i.e., whether the decision
is truly related to the legitimate outcome sought. Third, if the
defense succeeds, the plaintiff may then demonstrate that there
was an equally effective, but less discriminatory, tool available
that the decision-maker refused to use. 263 In Title VII, this is
referred to as the "alternative employment practice" test. 264 Thus,
the disparate impact injury can be described as the use of a
decision mechanism with a disproportionate impact on a protected
class when it is not a good predictor of future outcomes or there is
an alternative, equally effective, and less discriminatory decision
mechanism available.
In analyzing a disparate impact case based on predictive
policing, the first part of the test-that there is an observable
disparate impact-should be assumed to be true, or there is no
reason for the discussion. And in our prior work, Barocas and I
demonstrated why the business necessity defense will usually be
satisfied by data mining. 265 Essentially, data mining is a powerful
statistical prediction method for the legitimate outcomes sought by
the decision-maker, so as long as it is done well enough, it will
satisfy the test.266 Thus, the only remaining question is whether

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
See id.
262 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 705 (noting that "all circuits seem to accept
varying levels of job-relatedness').
263 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
264 Id.
265 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 706-09.
266 See id. at 708-09 ("[Tlhere is good reason to believe that any or all of the data mining
models predicated on legitimately job-related traits pass muster under the business
necessity defense.").
260
261
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there is an equally effective, but less discriminatory, alternative.
The obvious answer is to fix the model. But that is deceptively
difficult.267
First, as discussed in Part II, data miners must make
necessarily subjective judgments that are unavoidable aspects of
system design. How the target variable is defined may lead to
more or less discriminatory results, yet it will not necessarily be
obvious which choice will lead to worse results on protected
classes. 268 As Oscar Gandy has noted, "certain kind[s] of biases
are inherent in the selection of the goals or objective functions that
automated systems will [be] designed to support." 269 Should
predictions be broken down by type of crime, or some other value?
Are three different crime categories better than seven? It is
impossible to say in the abstract. The police officers will choose
based on their views of how to most faithfully and usefully predict
and prevent crime within their jurisdictions.2 7 0 That is their
primary-and arguably only-goal.
But the decisions will
necessarily have different effects on different racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic groups.
Similarly, for the number and granularity of features chosen,
one might think that the optimal goal is greater precision. But
police resources for data collection are not unlimited, and some
data that would be theoretically ideal may not be available due to
either cost or inaccessibility. The choice of how much or which
data to collect will often be made on the basis of cost or
convenience, and thoughts about what is even possible will depend
on the available data, rather than on imagining what is possible if
someone goes out and collects more. 271 This risk is magnified by
the availability of third-party data collected for the commercial
market, 272 where the features chosen come as a package deal, and
the overall package is determined not by what is best for the
particular police jurisdiction, but by which data broker has the
best price. Like target variable definition, the decisions about data
See id. at 709-11.
See id. at 715 (discussing the difficulties of defining the target variable).
269 Gandy, supra note 108, at 39.
270 See Bachner, supra note 8,at 20.
271 See Calders & Zliobaite, supra note 155, at 52-53.
272 See PERRY ET AL., supra note 9, at 77 (explaining that many police departments
"subscribe to commercial services" for crime data).
267
268
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collection and costs of more comprehensive data collection are
subjective, and the "correct" ones are impossible to identify in the
abstract. In both cases, however, decisions made on the basis of
"better" policing will invariably have different effects on
vulnerable groups. There is no system of disparate impact liability
that will hold decision-makers liable for decisions in service of the
proper goals where there is no clear less discriminatory
27 3
alternative.
Once a discriminatory result is discovered, the reasons for it are
likely to be unclear. Even if the result can be traced to a data
quality problem, those problems are often quite complicated to
rectify. It might be easy to determine that something is off about
the data, but it can be more difficult to figure out what that
something is. While the source of some biases might be clear on
the face of the analysis, most others are not. For example, the
potential for skewed data because of biases in distribution of prior
police resources is the most well-known data quality issue with
predictive policing. 274 Thus, it makes sense to check if that is what
might be causing the skew. When past crime data is involved in
the calculus, then the source of bias is clear. 275 But commercial or
social media data is likely to have biases that are not as apparent
and could be skewing the program's outputs in unknown ways,
with no way to investigate.
Even if all the sources of bias are identified, the magnitude of
each source's effect is still likely unknown. Suppose a department
implements Chicago's "heat list," with the intention of naming the
top 400 most likely people to be involved in a shooting. 276 Then
suppose that 95% of the names on the list are those of black men.
By almost any measure, this hypothetical list appears to
disproportionately target black men. But there is no baseline by
which to measure how much the bias is contributing. It is not
obvious how to subtract out what portion of the 95% prediction is
due to discriminatory -results, and what is attributable to black
men in the city actually being more likely to be involved in violent

273
274
275
276

Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012).
See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 127-31 and accompanying text.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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crime than their population numbers might suggest. 277 But
without an omniscient outside source of data, it is unclear where
such baseline data should come from.
The problem will not always be data quality, either. Returning
to the hypothetical "heat list" that is 95% populated by black men,
suppose-ignoring all the problems just discussed-it were
possible to determine that the prediction should have been 45%
black men, with the other 50% resulting from a discriminatory
algorithm. If someone wanted to correct the disparate impact, how
would he go about doing so? The first step would be to identify the
source of disparate impact. Bad data is only one of the possible
ways the model could have gone wrong. It could also be the
problem definition, feature choice, or feature granularity. But just
like determining the source of bad data, figuring out whether the
real culprit is the data or something else may not even be possible.
Worse, if there is both bad data and other sources of bias, the
degree to which each is at fault is uncertain. If bad data is always
an option, it will not be clear on the face of the problem if the data
miner has chosen a target variable or particular features that lead
to the disparate impact, and, therefore, it will not be clear what
should be fixed.
In other words, trying to determine the single cause of
disparate impact that results from these machines is a flawed
exercise, and often practically impossible. With data mining, some
disparate impact will occur as a result of the use of the system in
the first place, unless it is specifically mitigated. 278 The only way
to ensure that a data mining system will not discriminate is to not
use it.279 When there are background differences in the arrest
rates of protected and unprotected classes, it will be impossible to
have a system that can remove disparate impact by all available
28 0
measures.

277
278

See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 718.
Michael Feldman et al., Certifying and Removing Disparate Impact, PROC. 21ST ACM

SIGKDD INT'L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 259 (2015).
279 See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 728.
This might seem like an argument to
entirely block their use, but other systems reliably result in discriminatory outcomes as
well. The ones resulting from data mining are just more easily quantified.
280 See Kleinberg et al., supra note 75 (concluding that, if base rates of a predicted
characteristic differ, it is impossible to satisfy all of the identified "fairness constraints"
simultaneously in predicting that trait).
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Disparate impact doctrine considers the presence of
discrimination a binary question and either finds someone at fault
for causing it or finds no discrimination at all. Perhaps
counterintuitively, this is true of both disparate treatment and
disparate impact regimes. In a disparate treatment regime, the
human decision is obvious-it is the intentional decision to
discriminate. 28 1 In a disparate impact regime, however, the law
still attempts to trace a human decision to the injury-specifically,
the choice of the screening mechanism that resulted in the
disparate outcome. A finding of disparate impact liability is still a
finding of blameworthiness, and ultimately, once we accept that
data mining is permissible, there is nobody to blame for the
presence of disparate results. Therefore, disparate impact doctrine
will blame no one.
2. Disagreements About the Meaning of Discrimination. The
failures of the liability model described above presume that its
normative goals are well understood and agreed upon. In most
contexts where discrimination is an issue, however, normative
agreement does not exist, and predictive policing adds an
additional wrinkle. If one could imagine a data mining scenario in
which all the variables mentioned so far are correct-ignoring that
"correct" is itself subjective-the disparate impact might still
28 2
reflect the reality according to the thing one is trying to predict.
To the extent that, because of background inequalities, criminal
28 3
behavior is truly distributed unequally between racial groups,
the proper response is up for debate.
Consider again the "heat list" hypothetical. If the "accurate"
percentage of the list that should be black is 45%, and if the actual
28 4
population is 33% black (Chicago, according to the 2010 census),
then the discrepancy reflects criminal disparities between races.

281 See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993).
22
183

See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 691-92.
See Benforado, supra note 256, at 847-48 (" '[N]eighbourhood effects on offending can

and do sometimes exist,' and in what amounts to a vicious circle, these effects may be
perpetuated by the offending that they encourage." (footnote omitted) (quoting Anthony E.
Bottoms, Place, Space, Crime, and Disorder, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY
528, 559 (Mike Maguire et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007))).
284 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Profile of General Populationand Housing Characteristics:2010,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/ sf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmik (last
visited Sept. 21, 2017).
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But people will disagree about whether that 12% difference is a
discriminatory result as the law understands discrimination. On
the one hand, the model is saying to focus on a list that is
disproportionately made up of black men. On the other, if black
men are disproportionately committing the crimes, then the
machine cannot be blamed for picking up on that.
This debate reflects a longstanding tension between antidiscrimination
law's
two
competing
normative
models:
anticlassification
and
antisubordination. 2 5
Under
the
anticlassification theory, the responsibility of the law is simply to
prevent harm to protected classes due to the choices of decisionmakers. 28 6 The anticlassification model would suggest that, if it is
not the predictive policing tool itself that is causing the
discrimination, then the users of the tool cannot be held
responsible for it. By contrast, antisubordination sees the project
of antidiscrimination as one designed to eliminate substantive
inequality as a result of membership in the protected class, no
matter the cause. 28 7 Under the antisubordination theory, racially
disparate results are simply intolerable and should -be rectified.
There is a valid argument to be made for each perspective. A
focus on antisubordination suggests that, to the extent that data
mining reflects the status quo, addressing disparate impact
amounts to asking police to catch fewer criminals and to predict
fewer crimes. There is also an inherent unfairness in making a
single decision-maker responsible for all of the structural
discrimination in society, as discussed above. At the same time, no
matter the cause, the criminal justice system's focus on
communities of color "lock[s] people of color into a permanent
second-class citizenship." 28 8 Even if the algorithm is accurate,
merely accepting that result seems intolerable from the
perspective of working to fix the inequities reflected in the
28 9
disparate-yet accurate-result.
285

See Helen Norton, The Supreme Court's Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum

Understandingof Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 206-15 (2010); see also Bagenstos,
supranote 238, at 40-42 & nn.214-15 (2006) (collecting sources).
286 See Norton, supra note 285, at 208-09.
287 See id. at 206.
288 ALEXANDER, supra note 99, at 13.
289 Further complicating data-driven discrimination in the policing context, even before a
sector in which an anti-discrimination law is in place, is that the "discrimination" is not
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Importantly, though, this difficulty might be more theoretical
than real. As mentioned in Part II, it may be impossible to tell
when the disparate impact truly reflects reality. 290 The "accurate"
45% number is made up for this hypothetical, but it is often not
detectable in reality for the reasons laid out above. In most cases,
"reducing the disparate impact will necessitate open-ended
exploration without any way of knowing when analysts have
exhausted the possibility for improvement." 291 Bad crime data
makes this a fairly likely scenario, and it will often be impossible
to fully disentangle disparate impact due to algorithm design. If
there is uncertainty whether the result reflects reality, then the
arguments for removing disparate impact and the difficulties of
doing so revert to the prior discussion.
In a wrinkle specific to predictive policing, what counts as
adverse may not be as clear as a context such as employment. If a
resources
police
focus
that
the
model
recommends
disproportionately on communities of color, then, as this Article
argues, the additional focus is likely to lead to a discriminatory
harm by bringing more people of color into contact with the police,
which will lead to disproportionate arrest rates in those
But what about the other residents of the
communities.
community? If there is more crime in a neighborhood (either
perceived or real), the residents there may actually want a greater
police presence. Deciding to forego the added police presence could
even be a disparate treatment violation in itself.
Instead, it
This normative impasse may be unresolvable.
suggests that democratic input could be valuable, especially

necessarily tethered to protected class, because there is no statute that says it must be. In
one sense of the word, data mining discriminates by its very nature. It sorts and selects
between otherwise similarly situated people to find the major points along which
predictions can be made. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 677. In this sense, there
is nothing inherently special about legally defined protected classes. Data mining will
indiscriminately disadvantage the disadvantaged along whatever axis is relevant. See
generally Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014). As a society, we have decided that such
discrimination is more concerning when that axis is a protected class. But perhaps in the
policing context, it is as damaging to overpolice poor neighborhoods as it is communities of
color. For the purposes of this proposal, discrimination is treated in the traditional sense,
but in the face of data mining-focused discrimination, that decision need not be fixed.
290 See supra Part II.C.
291 See supra Part lI.C.
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in towns and
with smaller constituencies
engagement
292
answer,
of
a
more
definitive
In the absence
neighborhoods.
localized political groups are more likely to agree outright or
compromise about the right approach to issues that affect them
locally. It will not always work, but resolution is more likely to
come at the local level than from a top-down approach, and then
knowledge can be shared between the smaller subgroups. 293 Thus,
the approach proposed in Part IV attempts to take this into
account.
IV. TOWARD A REGULATORY SOLUTION

A new legislative approach is necessary. The last Part offered
some hints as to what a new approach should look like, but a
legislative approach must address a few more considerations. At a
high level, there are actually two separate problems to address: (1)
the substantive challenge-predictive policing systems have the
potential for discriminatory results; and (2) the precursor
problem-a lack of knowledge about the effectiveness and
discriminatory impact of predictive policing systems. Currently,
police do not understand the technology they adopt. They do not
understand or investigate either the technology's effectiveness or
its side effects. 294 It is hard to say in the abstract what stronger
regulatory solutions may be required, or how big a problem the
technology poses in reality, until more information about the
technology's implementation is created. And right now, there is
little incentive for the various actors to understand it at all.
Therefore, this Part argues that before adopting predictive
policing technology, police should be required to create
"algorithmic impact statements" (AISs), modeled on the
environmental impact statements (EISs) of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 295 Impact statements have
See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitutionof Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 317-18 (1998) (arguing that local civil engagement is effective in
improving police services).
293 See id. at 326 (describing the benefits of "reciprocating consultation between central
and local levels").
294 Ferguson, supra note 12, at 1117 ("Whether good, bad, ineffective, or distracting, the
long-term trend has been to adopt predictive technologies regardless of effectiveness.").
295 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
292
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become a much-emulated regulatory tool where the problem at
hand is a lack of knowledge about the effects of a particular type of
decision. 296 While AISs will not necessarily achieve the full
measure of accountability that will eventually be required, they
will be useful-and perhaps necessary-to determine what, if
anything, society will need to do next.
A. ALGORITHMIC IMPACT STATEMENTS

The goal of this proposed legislation is not necessarily to curtail
the use of new predictive policing technologies. The AISs would
have two purposes. First, they would ensure "that the agency, in
reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully
consider,
detailed
information
concerning
significant
297
[discriminatory] impacts."
Second, they would "guarantee that
the relevant information will be made available to the larger
audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking
process and the implementation of that decision." 298 The EIS
model is important precisely because, without the requirement,
"information about prospective.., harms and potential mitigating
measures" simply would not exist. 299 Presently, there is too little
public engagement regarding predictive policing, and other users
of algorithmic tools do not currently know what the ultimate social
effects of these tools will be. Without some intervention, critical
knowledge about these systems might never be created.
Since the passage of NEPA in 1969, impact assessments have
been a model for "action-forcing" regulation designed to push
decision-makers to do their homework and engage with the
public. 30 0 As Bradley Karkkainen has observed: "NEPA is without
question the most widely emulated of the major U.S.
environmental laws. It has inspired dozens of 'little NEPAs' at the

2w See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA- Monitoring and Managing
Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 (2002).
297 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
298 Id.
299 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008).
8Qo See e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976) ("Section 102(2)(C) is one of
the 'action-forcing' provisions intended as a directive to 'all agencies to assure consideration
of the environmental impact of their actions in decisionmaking.' " (quoting Conference
Report on NEPA, 115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969))).
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30 1
state and local levels.., and countless imitators in other fields."
And the relevance of environmental law to this problem may be
more than just coincidence. Cathy O'Neil has argued that "[i]f you
think of [data mining] as a factory, unfairness is the black stuff
30 2
belching out of the smoke stacks. It's an emission, a toxic one."
Thinking of discrimination as an inevitable byproduct of data
mining's machinery can be a useful construct. Others have also
drawn analogies between data and environmental concerns.
Michael Froomkin has written that lessons from NEPA can be
applied to the regulation of mass surveillance. 30 3 Similarly,
Dennis Hirsch has likened data breaches to oil spills in service of
an argument that other parts of environmental law can be a model
30 4
for greater data privacy protection as well.
Some of the existing NEPA-inspired legislation bears directly
on issues of data use, discrimination, or both. For example,
administrative agencies are required to conduct privacy impact
assessments (PIAs) "when developing or procuring information
identifiable
personally
that include
systems
technology
Other countries use them too. The United
information."30 5
Kingdom recommends "equality impact assessments" as part of
the "public sector Equality Duty," which requires attention to
discrimination concerns in all activities by public bodies. 30 6 And
the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
and accompanying Police and Criminal Justice Authorities
Directive both require data protection impact assessments (DPIAs)
whenever data processing "is likely to result in a high risk to the

Karkkainen, supra note 296, at 905-06.
O'NEIL, supra note 111, at 95.
303 See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillanceas PrivacyPollution:
Learning from Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1755. In a
similar vein, David Wright and Charles Raab have argued for "surveillance impact
assessments" (SIAs) to address the effects of surveillance systems. The SIA process would
be "similar to that of a privacy impact assessment (PIA), but [ ] an SIA must take account of
a wider range of issues, impacts and stakeholders." David Wright & Charles D. Raab,
Constructinga Surveillance Impact Assessment, 28 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 613, 613
(2012).
304 See Dennis D. Hirsch, The Glass House Effect: Big Data,the New Oil, and the Power of
Analogy, 66 ME. L. REV. 373, 375 (2014).
& Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in
305 Kenneth A. Bamberger
Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 76 (2008).
306 Review of Public Sector Equality Duty, GOv.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/grou
ps/review-of-public-sector-equality-duty-steering-group (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
301
302
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rights and freedoms of natural persons." 30 7 The recitals in both
30 8
laws suggest that discrimination is one such high-risk concern.
Outside of the data context, several states have adopted racial
impact assessments as part of sentencing policy to learn more
about how proposed changes are likely to affect people of color
30 9
before implementation.
The NEPA process and larger impact statement model have
drawn strong support and sharp criticism. In the benefits column,
they can force government agencies to both think hard about the
collateral effects of the proposed policy and justify the policy to the
public. 310 Scholars looking back have argued that the process has
been ingrained into the core of how administrative agencies now
do their work, 311 and it has "create[d] powerful pressures on
agency decisionmakers to avoid the most environmentally
damaging courses of action." 312 As for the negatives, the NEPA
process has been criticized as overly long, too costly, and
ultimately toothless. 3 13 Much of the criticism, though, is about the
particulars of NEPA, rather than the core principles-that it is too

307 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, art. 35, 2016
O.J. (L 119 1) 1, 59 [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR]; Directive
(EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent
Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of
Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, and Repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, art. 27 O.J. (L 119)
89, 116 [hereinafter Police and Criminal Justice Authorities Directive].
308 GDPR, supra note 307, Recital 75, at 15; Police and Criminal Justice Authorities
Directive, supra note 307 Recital 51, at 96-97.
309 See Catherine London, Racial Impact Statements: A ProactiveApproach to Addressing
Racial Disparities in Prison Populations, 29 L. & INEQ. 211, 226-31 (2011) (noting that
"[r]acial impact statements are modeled on fiscal and environmental impact statements").
310 Paul J. Culhane, NEPA's Impacts on Federal Agencies, Anticipated and Unanticipated,
20 ENVTL. L. 681, 690 (1990) ('The resources policy community should not overlook the
importance of a simple, but definitely non-trivial outcome of NEPA. Environmental impacts
are now considered in making natural resources decisions."); SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING
BUREAUCRACIES

THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 251 (1984).
311 See TAYLOR, supra note 310, at 262 ("Since the advent of NEPA, environmental

concerns have been officially incorporated into every agency's charter.").
312 Karkkainen, supra note 296, at 905.
313 See id. (summarizing the criticisms of the EIS process).
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easy for an agency to avoid doing an EIS, 314 that the explanation
requirements are not backed up by accountability for failure to act
on them, 315 or that judges have been too deferential to agency
factfinding. 31 6 The fact that an EIS is prescriptive and frozen in
time is another commonly-cited weakness of NEPA. 317 Thus, the
criticisms of NEPA can be lessons for future implementations,
while the core rationales for the EIS model fit exceptionally well
with the considerations laid out in the prior section.
1. AIS Requirements. Before discussing costs and benefits of
the model, it is important to understand what such legislation
would actually entail, beginning with the requirements of the AIS
itself. The regulation at the "heart of the environmental impact
statement"318 lists its six requirements:
(a) Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all
reasonable alternatives, and for alternatives which
were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss
the reasons for their having been eliminated.
(b) Devote substantial treatment to each alternative
considered in detail including the proposed action so
that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits.

314 See id. at 908 (explaining how, through a "mitigated Finding of No Significant
Impact... an agency might avoid the cost and administrative burden associated with a full
[EIS]").
316 Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The Withering Away of the
National Environmental Policy Act's Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
245, 246 (2000) ("Now in its thirtieth year, the Supreme Court and disinterested executive
leadership have essentially rendered NEPA's substantive objectives and declarations for
environmental quality legally impotent.'); see also Ray Clark, NEPA The Rational
Approach to Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND NEPA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
15, 23 (Ray Clark & Larry Canter eds., 1997) (observing that many public officials regard
NEPA as merely "a rigid paperwork exercise" rather than "a way to maintain or achieve
environmental objectives").
316 See Aliza M. Cohen, Note, NEPA in the Hot Seat: A Proposal for an Office of
EnvironmentalAnalysis, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 169, 198 (2010).
317

See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A

STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 31-33 (1997) (recommending
adaptive management in the face of high ecosystem uncertainty); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L.
Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424, 429-30 (2010)
("[From the earliest emergence of ecosystem management policy, there has been broad
consensus among resource managers and academics that adaptive management is the only
practical way to implement ecosystem management.").
318 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2017).
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(c) Include reasonable alternatives not within the
jurisdiction of the lead agency.
(d) Include the alternative of no action.
(e) Identify the agency's preferred alternative or
alternatives, if one or more exists, in the draft
statement and identify such alternative in the final
statement unless another law prohibits the expression
of such a preference.
(f) Include appropriate mitigation measures not
action or
already included in the proposed
319
alternatives.
Five of these requirements are directly portable to AISs, and the
other suggests a similar rule that AISs can adopt. Each are
considered here in turn.
Rigorously Explore and Objectively Evaluate All
a.
Reasonable Alternatives. The twin primary purposes of an AIS are
(1) that police departments (and potentially other agencies) think
hard about and investigate the particular choices they make
rather than blindly using the first algorithm they think of or
encounter, and (2) that they create the knowledge regarding the
Thus, the requirement to
ultimate effects of their choices.
rigorously explore and objectively evaluate the algorithms is
central. Exploration and evaluation does not necessarily mean
that the algorithms themselves need be human-readable or
interpretable 32 0 -such a requirement could potentially hinder the
adoption of a wide swath of possible software. 32 1 Rather, the data
miners must (1) explain the various design choices, (2) measure
the resulting efficacy using the best available audit methods, and
(3) evaluate the resulting disparate impact for the various systems
and configurations. In this regime, it is not necessary to know
exactly why those differences occur-the why might not even be
319

Id.

See generally Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633,
662-72 (2017) (arguing that technical tools can be designed for automatically ensuring
regularity).
320

321

See Zachary C. Lipton, The Mythos of Model Interpretability, PRoc. 2016 ICML

WORKSHOP ON HUMAN INTERPRETABILITY IN MACHINE LEARNING 96 ("[A]rguments against
black-box algorithms appear to preclude any model that could match or surpass our abilities
on complex tasks.").
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answerable-but in order to evaluate competing alternatives, the
efficacy and side effects must be measured.
The word "reasonable" does a lot of work here and will require
interpretation.3 22 There are essentially an infinite number of
possible alternative algorithms: new target variables can be
chosen, new or better data collected or purchased, and new
features examined. The number of alternatives considered will
depend on the specifics of the technologies at issue, and will mostly
be left to the considered judgment of the professionals. Designers
should also consider state-of-the-art "brute force" disparate impact
removal.
In other words, they should consider pre- or postprocessing techniques to remove disparate impact and conduct an
analysis of whether, and to what degree, it can be done without
affecting the overall quality of the algorithm. As with any reliance
on reasonableness, this will spur litigation. 323 Ultimately, there is
no way around this. Regulating police in this way is a somewhat
radical change that some departments will resist. As such, the
threat of litigation for unreasonably skimpy AISs is a necessary
element.
b. Devote Substantial Treatment to Each Alternative. An AIS
should "[d]evote substantial treatment to each alternative
considered in detail ...so that reviewers may evaluate their
comparative merits. ' 324 This requirement is self-explanatory. The
information in an AIS "must be of high quality."3 25 Reviewers need
enough detail to know whether the department actually considered
the various alternatives, or whether they should challenge the
decision procedurally.

322 Cf. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
("[R]easonable alternatives does not require 'crystal ball' inquiry. Mere administrative
difficulty does not interpose such flexibility... as to undercut the duty of compliance 'to the
fullest extent possible.' But... [t]he statute must be construed ...not to demand what is,
fairly speaking, not meaningfully possible .. " (footnote omitted)). When the Supreme Court
narrowed the scope of alternatives needing consideration in Vermont Yankee Nuclear.Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), it held that not every
"conceivable" alternative need be considered, but failed to attach the word "reasonable" to
alternatives anywhere in the opinion. Id. at 551.
323 See, e.g., Morton, 458 F.2d at 829 ('This appeal raises a question as to the scope of the
requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) that environmental impact
statements contain a discussion of alternatives." (footnote omitted)).
324 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(b) (2017).
325 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (2017).
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Include Reasonable Alternatives Not Within the
c.
Jurisdiction. NEPA requires that an EIS "[i]nclude reasonable
326 This
alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead agency."
is the requirement that does not directly apply to an AIS, at least
as envisioned here. 32 7 The NEPA process applies to any agency
that might take an action that affects the environment. Multiple
agencies, such as Fish and Wildlife Service, National Forest
Service, Bureau of Land Management, etc. could end up
coordinating, and a modification that might mitigate the proposed
impact might be outside their reach--either in the jurisdiction of
another agency, or outside what congressional authorization
permits them to do.
The jurisdictional limits on police are few. Usually they are
charged broadly with enforcing the criminal law. 328 The decision
to use predictive policing tools is not one that will be considered by
more than one type of agency, so the requirement is mostly
inapplicable here. But if considered for applications outside
policing, this requirement may once again apply. For example, if a
particular data set would help alleviate some discrimination that
would otherwise result, but that data set is owned and used by
another agency, then the AIS should consider it. This may be true
even where law prevents inter-agency access. As the Council on
Environmental Quality has explained, an "EIS may serve as the
basis for modifying the Congressional approval or funding in light
of NEPA's goals and policies." 32 9 In a similar vein, the AIS might
spur political action locally, either to grant or restrict funding, or
to bar certain choices by the police department. Because the AIS

40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(c) (2017).
It would apply directly if the AIS requirement were expanded to any public sector use
of data mining, which, while not necessarily a large logical leap, is outside the scope of this
Article.
328 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 28, at 1831, 1844.
326
327

COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FORTY MOST ASKED
QUESTIONS CONCERNING CEQ'S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT POLICY ACT REGULATIONS § 2(b)
329

(1981), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/G-CEQ-40Questions.pdf; see also Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ('The mere fact that an
alternative requires legislative implementation does not automatically establish it as
beyond the domain of what is required for discussion.. .

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2017

67

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2017], Art. 6

176

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:109

may generate the only source of information about these
algorithms, 330 this part of the AIS is also potentially useful.
d.
Include the Alternative of No Action.
The NEPA
regulations specifically require that the "alternative of no action"
be included. 33' This is crucial here as well. If the disparate impact
is unavoidable and of an unacceptable degree, then the police must
actively consider not going forward with their proposal and
declining to adopt the technology. Predictable consequences of the
"no action" alternative, such as potential limitations on criminal
332
enforcement, should also be included in the analysis.
The "no action" alternative is particularly important as the
primary mechanism by which police departments will ask whether
adoption of the predictive policing system will be better or worse
than the discriminatory status quo.
There will be a great
temptation to give short shrift to this section. Police (as with
many other institutional actors) will often seek reasons to adopt
new technology, rather than reasons not to adopt technology that
may have harmful effects. 333 And often these systems are sold as
cost-cutting measures for cash-strapped departments for whom the
budget is much more tangible than potential externalities that
affect the community.3 3 4 But if there is a risk that these systems
will result in net harm, then the "no action" alternative must be
preserved.
This is another reason that the AIS must be performed before a
project proceeds, rather than as it is underway. Once money and
other resources are committed, the question of whether the project
goes forward at all instead becomes a question of how it will
proceed. After all, if the AIS says that it should not go forward,
then the person that already committed the resources to it-who is
3-0 Cf. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008) ("[W]ithout [an EIS],
there may be little if any information about prospective environmental harms and potential
mitigating measures.").
33140 C.F.R. § 1502.14(d) (2017).
Cf. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 329, § 3.
3 See generally Barry Friedman, We Spend $100 Billion On Policing. We Have No Idea

332

What Works, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/
wp/2017/03/10/we-spend-100-billion-on-policing-we-have-no-idea-what-works/?utm-term=.Oec
3fde479cb.
3
See, e.g., The ROI of Predictive Policing, PREDPOL, http://info.predpol.com/roi-of-predic
tive-policing (last visited Sept. 23, 2017) (advertising the purported efficiency-maximizing
benefits of the PredPol system).
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also likely involved in the AIS process-will have wasted a whole
The path dependence and political pull of
lot of money.
demonstrable progress all but guarantee that if an AIS is not
performed prior to the beginning of the project, the "no action"
335
alternative will not be considered as fully as required.
e.
Identify the Agency's Preferred Alternative in Draft
Assessment. In the EIS model, public comments are solicited
between the production of a draft and the final EIS. 336 The same
would be true of AISs. Additionally, a police department must
indicate its preferred alternative among the algorithm design
choices within the draft AIS. 337 This is important so that
reviewers and commenters know both what to focus on and what
the likeliest course of action will be if nothing changes.
f. Include Appropriate Mitigation Measures. Lastly, the AIS
should include mitigation measures.3 3 8 That is, if the police
determine that they need to use these models and recognize that
some disparate impact will result, they must explore ways of
mitigating the impact within the harmed communities. Broadly,
these could be interventions other than arrests for identified
people. 339 One possibility has already been discussed. Chicago
originally planned to use the Strategic Subjects List to call in
social services to aid those that were likely to be involved in crime.
Instead, Chicago used the list to identify people for greater
surveillance. 340 The plan, in theory, would have been a good
example of mitigation. Another mitigation strategy could be
combining location-based predictive policing with community
policing strategies that are proven to reduce fear and improve
community relations with police. 341 Mitigation procedures include

- See W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 116 (1989) (explaining the "lock-in" effect of technology
adoption).
3.36 See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a) (2017).
337 Cf. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(e) (2017).
-8 Cf. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(f) (2017).
39 See Harmon, supra note 177, at 359.
340 See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
341 See Gary Cordner, Community Policing, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLICE AND
POLICING 148, 164 (Michael D. Reisig & Robert J. Kane eds., 2014) ("[Clommunity policing
seems to have clear-cut advantages over competing police strategies when it comes to
making the public feel safer and enhancing the public's satisfaction with the police.").
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anything that could lessen the burden that the use of predictive
policing technology may create or exacerbate.
2. The Remaining AIS Framework. Though AISs are the heart
of the proposed regulation, there are important details that must
attend them to make the proposal effective. Particularly, there
must be opportunities for public comment and strong judicial
oversight, both procedural and substantive.
Public comment is an incredibly important part of the AIS
process. 342 Under NEPA, regulations require two notice-andcomment periods during the EIS process: one to define the scope of
the proposed draft EIS, 343 and one after the draft EIS to allow
public comment on the information generated before the final
EIS. 344 In the final version, agencies must respond to any
opposing views that were not adequately addressed in the draft
EIS. 3 45 These two comment periods can be ported directly into the
AIS framework. The first would allow civil society groups and
members of the public to register concerns with predictive policing
that pertain to the specific jurisdiction as a general matter, and
the second would allow public response to the direction that the
department is heading and the concerns the department has
already considered.
Public comment would not be a panacea. For example, where
there are conflicting definitions of fairness, 346 the police
department or another agency will have the initial power to
determine which definition of fairness they think is the most
proper. One thing public comment would accomplish, however, is
to inform the agency that there are several standard definitions of

342

See Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental

Policy Act's Process for Citizen Participation, 26 ENVTL. L. 53, 55 (1996) ("[C]itizen
participation in the creation of NEPA-mandated [EISs] has, in all likelihood, spawned the
largest amount of citizen participation in environmental decision making over the last two
decades.").
343 See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2017) ("As soon as practicable after its decision to prepare an
[EIS] and before the scoping process the lead agency shall publish a notice of intent
(§ 1508.22) ....(a) As part of the scoping process the lead agency shall: (1) Invite the
participation of ... other interested persons . . .
344 See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2017).
345 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b) (2017).
346 See Julia Angwin & Jeff Larson, Bias in Criminal Risk Scores Is Mathematically
Inevitable, Researchers Say, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/articl
e/bias-in-criminal-risk-scores-is-mathematically-inevitable-researchers-say.
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fairness with different implications within that jurisdiction.
Before the ProPublica article on Northpointe sparked a very public
hearing on definitions of fairness, 347 it was not clear that the
engineers designing the algorithm would have understood that
they were encoding normative judgments into their system. Public
comment, especially at the scoping stage, can bring issues like that
to the fore early on. Once raised, at either the scoping or draft
stage, the department would be required to discuss why it focused
on a particular choice, and to include this concern as part of its
publicly-reasoned decision.
Judicial review is also key to ensuring that the AIS process has
some teeth. 348 The procedural requirements can be ported directly
from the Administrative Procedure Act (or state equivalents),
which requires courts to set aside arbitrary and capricious actions
by agencies as well as actions that fail to comport with procedural
requirements.349
A weakness of NEPA is that it is wholly procedural and lacks
any substantive force.
Under NEPA, once an environmental
impact is identified, the agency is free to simply ignore the
problem and forge ahead.3 50 That is, an agency must strictly
347 See Sam Corbett-Davies et al., A Computer Program Used for Bail and Sentencing
Decisions Was Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It's Actually Not That Clear, WASH. POST
(Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.comnews/monkey-cage/wp/2016/1O/17/can-analgorithm-be-racist-our-analysis-is-more-cautious-than-propublicas/ ("[A]t the heart of their
disagreement is a subtle ethical question: What does it mean for an algorithm to be fair?");
see also Angwin et al., supra note 44 (investigating the racial bias of Northpointe's
COMPAS program used to set bail and sentence duration in courts across the country).
348 Judicial review has been quite important to NEPA. See generally Nicolas C. Yost &
James W. Rubin, Administrative Implementation of and Judicial Review Under the
National Environmental Policy Act, in 1 THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 10:1,
Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2017). See also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421
(1976) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]his vaguely worded
statute seems designed to serve as no more than a catalyst for development of a 'common
law' of NEPA. To date, the courts have responded in just that manner and have created
such a 'common law.' Indeed, that development is the source of NEPA's success.").
i 9 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
350 See Karkkainen, supra note 296, at 910-11 (noting that "NEPA itself leaves
decisionmakers discretion to ignore" information provided in an EIS); see also,
e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-52 (1989) (noting that
because NEPA is procedural, the agency is not required to act on the EIS); id. at 351 n.16
("NEPA merely prohibits uninformed-rather than unwise-agency action."); Strycker's
Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (holding that NEPA is
designed to generate informed decisionmaking but does not require the agency to elevate
environmental concerns over other considerations).
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adhere to the procedural requirements of NEPA, but a reviewing
court cannot second-guess the choices the agency makes about how
Many commentators believe
to value competing alternatives.
NEPA could have had substantive force, had it not been
In Strycker's Bay
eviscerated by unfriendly courts. 35 1
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, for example, the Supreme
Court overturned the Second Circuit's holding that an agency's
environmental determinations "should be given determinative
weight."352 The Court wrote that NEPA is "essentially procedural"
and not subject to even arbitrary and capricious substantive
353
review.
An AIS-implementing statute need not be restricted by such a
limitation. The AIS statute could expressly call for substantive
review of the choices made in the AIS. NEPA arguably did so. As
Nicholas Yost has argued, the legislators passing NEPA thought
they were embedding substantive policy goals in the statute, and
early courts recognized that purpose. 354 The AIS review could
include something more searching than arbitrary and capricious
review, such as 'hard look" review, 355 which requires some

351 See, e.g., Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy Act:
Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA's Progeny, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 217
(1992) (Section heading: "NEPA Before the Supreme Court: Extinguishing Substantive
Review."); David R. Hodas, NEPA, Ecosystem Management and EnvironmentalAccounting,
14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 2000, at 185, 186-87 (arguing that the Supreme Court
has been too deferential to agencies, thus undermining the substantive goals of NEPA);
Lindstrom, supra note 315, at 249 ("NEPA's directives to federal agencies... [a]re not
flowery sentiments ...they are positive law binding on all parts of the federal
government."); Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA's Promise-PartiallyFulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533,
534 (1990) (arguing that "[s]ubstantive review under NEPA" is "essentially unfulfilled');
The National Environmental Policy Act: An Interview with William Hedeman, Jr., EPA J.,
Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 29, 30, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/national-environmental-pol
icy-act-interview-william-hedeman-jr.html ("I feel that much of NEPA's problem in the past
has been the manner in which it has been interpreted by the courts.... Unfortunately,
most of this litigation has focused on procedural compliance with the requirements of NEPA
rather than getting to the basic substantive mandates of the Congress as reflected in
NEPA's goals and policies.").
352 444 U.S. at 227.
353 Id.
354 See Yost, supra note 351, at 535-39.
355 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council v.
Some state NEPA equivalents, like
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
California's, have more searching review. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15151 (2017) ("An
EIR should be prepared with a sufficient degree of analysis to provide decisionmakers with
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balancing of substantive costs and benefits.35 6
If the AIS
framework's purpose is clearly stated to be prevention of
discrimination, and there is an equally clear statement that
discrimination considerations deserve extra weight, judges could
ensure that the procedural components were guided mostly by
357
these concerns.
There is a limit, though. The level of substantive review cannot
be so high that a court is simply substituting its judgment for that
of the agency. 358 This is true for a few reasons. The AIS relies on
the expertise of the police in understanding the crime control
needs of their jurisdictions, and that expertise must be accorded
some deference. 35 9
But given the current state of extreme
deference to police, 36 0 it is hard to imagine courts being willing to
inject themselves much in police affairs, so this concern may not
manifest without broader cultural and political changes. Second,
there is still normative disagreement about what constitutes
discrimination, when it occurs, and what definitions of fairness are
appropriate. While the resulting disparate impact of different
algorithm designs can be compared against each other in the AIS,
in the end, substantive review of the AIS must compare the chosen
version of the model against some standard. And there is no
global normative standard by which to judge the adequacy of these
decisions in an absolute sense. 361 Giving courts strong substantive
review over implementation of the recommendations of MiSs shifts
information which enables them to make a decision which intelligently takes account of
environmental consequences.").
35 Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARV.L. REV. 421, 46374 (1987) (discussing costs and benefits of the "hard-look doctrine").
357 Philip Ferester has argued that courts ignored the substantive provisions of NEPA
because they are "vaguely drafted aspirational commands and are far more difficult to
apply" than the procedural provisions. Ferester, supra note 351, at 208. But he did not see
this as an inevitable consequence of the model; rather, he expressly argued that NEPA
should be amended based on state versions of NEPA with much stronger substantive
provisions. Id. at 230.
358See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 28, at 1876 ('Policing agencies today
possess unfathomable discretion, the appropriate control for which is democratically
sanctioned rules-not judicial judgments or (worse yet) naked deference.").
359 See id. at 1840 ("[C]ourts hold out the promise of greater deference to agency
interpretations of vague statutory terms when these interpretations are arrived at through
more deliberative processes.").
36 Id. at 1890, 1892.
361 See Bagenstos, supra note 238, at 34-40 (discussing the "deeply controversial" nature
of substantive discrimination standards).
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the responsibility for that determination from a combination of
policing agencies and public comment to the courts. On the whole,
this may be desirable if police prove unwilling to respond to public
concerns, but it must be understood that substantive review has
this shifting effect. It is a careful balance, but one that, at present,
suggests that substantive judicial review will help more than hurt.
B. ANTICIPATING OBJECTIONS

The AIS is not a perfect or complete solution. On its own terms,
it is more concerned with information creation than a
determination of when predictive policing becomes too
discriminatory, and how to prevent that from. occurring. This is
intentional. It is difficult to make policy recommendations when
the public knows so little about the technology and its
implementation. Even acknowledging that, however, the proposed
AIS regulation will encounter several objections, which this section
attempts to anticipate and address.
1. Costs. A major criticism of the EIS model is its length and
cost. 36 2 In the AIS case, the average police department is small
and may not be able to absorb these costs. 3 63 There are at least
three reasons, however, to think this might not be as big a barrier
as it first appears.
First, to a degree, the cost is a feature rather than a bug. Police
departments should not be adopting technology without
considering the ramifications, and the most likely reason that they
would do such a thing is the falling cost of technology. Society has
seen what comes from the availability of free technology to police
departments in the context of leftover or obsolete military
equipment. 36 4 Police have been given billions of dollars in military
equipment, 36 5 which in turn has led to increased violent
confrontations and default deployment of SWAT teams for minor
362 See Karkkainen, supra note 296, at 905; Sarah E. Light, NEPA's Footprint:
Information Disclosure as a Quasi-CarbonTax on Agencies, 87 TUL. L. REV. 511, 536 (2013).
36 See DUREN BANKS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 249681, NATIONAL SOURCES OF

LAw ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT DATA 1 (2016) ("The most common type of agency is the
small town police department that employs 10 or fewer officers.").
364 See Alicia Parlapiano, The Flow of Money and Equipment to Local Police, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/23/us/flow-of-money-and-equipm
ent-to-local-police.html.
365 See id.
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drug raids and to break up protests.366 Police surveillance has also
exploded largely because of the low cost of technology.3 67 The
unthinking adoption of technology due to its low cost is precisely
what this proposal aims to prevent, and aside from the substantive
requirements of AISs, if the cost alone causes police departments
to slow down and ask if they really need this new equipment, that
will aid in this proposal's goals. Intentionally adding friction to
368
decision-making is sometimes the correct policy choice.
Second, small departments being unable to meet the cost of
producing AiSs is not as overwhelming a problem as it might
appear. Police departments with ten or fewer officers are likely
located in small towns without much need of predictive policing
technology. 36 9 Arguably, the only reason they would consider such
a tool is the low cost. Additionally, there would be nothing
preventing this proposal from being adopted at the state level
rather than the local level-in fact, that seems more likely. Once
adopted, if state legislatures believe their towns should have
predictive policing equipment, they can work in partnership with
municipal police departments to produce AISs and defray the
costs, rather than leave the AISs solely to the localities. The
added benefit of such an arrangement is that the states
themselves would provide an extra layer of consideration before
the public has to even weigh in, allowing an additional opportunity
to weigh the costs and benefits.
Third, the AIS can import some of the cost-saving features from
NEPA. Because of the cost, agencies will go far out of their way to

36 See generally RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR Cop: THE MILITARIZATION

OF

AMERICA'S POLICE FORCES (2013) (noting the increasingly militarized nature of American
police forces); Molly Redden, The Pentagon Just Realized It Gave Too Much Military
Equipment to the Ferguson Police, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.motherjones.
com/politics/2015/08/pentagon-forces-ferguson-return-two-humvees-police-militarization-pro
gram/.
367 See Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of
Surveillance: Making Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J.F. 335, 335 (2014),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/tiny-constables-and-the-cost-of-surveillance-making-ce
nts-out-of-united-states-v-jones.
368 See Paul Ohm & Jonathan Frankle, Proof of Work: Learningfrom Computer Scientific
Approaches to Desirable Inefficiency (draft on file with author) (manuscript at 37-41)
(discussing the role of friction in various contexts).
369 See BANKS ET AL., supra note 363, at 1; Slobogin, supra note 25, at 135.
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avoid having to create an EIS. 370 This can be done because the
NEPA framework provides an agency with three options before it
seeks to implement a proposed course of action, of which the EIS is
The agency must either (1) apply a
the most demanding.
categorical exclusion, 37 1 (2) perform a smaller "environmental
assessment" 372 (EA), which, if it results in a "finding of no
significant impact," ends the process, 373 or (3) conduct an EIS.
Categorical exclusions are activities pre-determined to have no
significant environmental impact. 374 EAs allow federal agencies to
avoid conducting a full-blown EIS. Therefore, the cost criticism is
directly tied to separate criticism that agencies can too easily avoid
37 5
conducting an EIS.
But what does it mean to "avoid" an AIS in this way? Some
argue that these avoidance mechanisms are the reason NEPA has
been a shadow success. 376 If the reason that agencies can avoid
EISs is because they can create situations that already have been
approved, or take environmental concerns in early, then that is a
benefit of the scheme, whether or not an EIS is the end result.
Allowing departments to avoid AISs could have the desirable
effect of encouraging them to think about disparate impact early in
the process, so as to avoid the extra cost later. 377 At the moment,
police have no incentive to evaluate whether their systems are in
fact discriminatory. At a high level, the entire point of this
proposal is to get police to figure out how to do better on that score.
If there were a standardized set of test suites that could
demonstrate that a police department's chosen technology does not
have a significant disparate impact, then all the better. A market

370 See Light, supra note 362, at 535 ("The onerous EIS requirement creates incentives for
agencies to employ mitigation measures to bring the impact of an action on the environment
below the 'significance' threshold (that is, the point at which an EIS must be prepared).").
371 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2017).
372 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2017).
373 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2017).
374 Id.

375" See Karkkainen, supra note 296, at 905 (explaining that because of "the high triggering
threshold before an EIS is required," there are few actions that "receive full NEPA scrutiny").
376 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 310, at 251.
377 Cf. Karkkainen, supra note 296, at 913 ("[A]gencies now operate under strong internal
and external pressures to select and design projects from the start with an eye toward
reducing their adverse environmental consequences, precisely because they wish to avoid
embarrassing NEPA disclosures.").
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would undoubtedly develop in order to sell certified testing suites
that police departments could use to test their technology. If
avoiding an AIS is significantly less expensive, then police
departments will be encouraged to design to a standard that can
be easily and cheaply tested, while still flexible enough to be
properly applied to their jurisdictions.
Additionally, if police departments can use discriminationaware data mining378 at the design stage to reduce the ultimate
disparate impact, then that too could provide another way to avoid
a full AIS. This is comparable to the "mitigated finding of no
significant impact" (mitigated FONSI), a practice that federal
agencies use to avoid EISs.37 9 Although such mitigation is often
criticized as undercutting the goals of the statute, it may actually
accomplish them indirectly by forcing agencies to begin with a
better design to avoid the costs associated with a full EIS. 38 0 If the
way to avoid an AIS is to instead do better at avoiding disparate
impact early in the process, then that is a perfectly acceptable
victory.
Therefore, costs should not be as big a problem as people fear,
and cost-cutting measures could be included in the model.
2. Ineffectiveness of the EIS Model. Another criticism of the
impact statement model is its supposed ineffectiveness. This
critique has a couple flavors. One is that impact statements are
simply weak and do not accomplish anything. 38 1 This concern can
be driven by fears of poor design or regulatory capture, among
other things. It is also a reflection of differing ideas about what
constitutes an impact statement. Another flavor, addressed above,
is that agencies can too easily avoid doing a full AIS, and will do so
if given the opportunity.
The first concern is borne of observed practice.
In some
contexts, impact statements are fundamentally different
documents than those advocated here, and much less robust.
Fiscal impact statements attach a dollar figure to legislative
378 See, e.g., Feldman et al., supranote 278, at 259.
379 See Karkkainen, supra note 296, at 933-37 (detailing the use of mitigated FONSIs to

avoid EISs).
380 See id. at 935 ("Indeed, mitigated FONSIs might be considered evidence the NEPA is
having a tangible, proactive, environmentally beneficial effect on agency decisionmaking,
not dissimilar to the one NEPA's authors intended, albeit through an unexpected route.").
381 See supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
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proposals and perhaps provide some context about a state's
budget. 38 2 The "Anticipated Surveillance Impact Report," now
required in Santa Clara before police purchase surveillance
38 3 Several
equipment, is a short explanation of anticipated impact.
states have begun to require racial impact statements (RISs) in
the sentencing context to collect data and determine disparate
3 4 While there is
impact resulting from new sentencing policy.
value in the transparency that these documents provide, these
versions of impact statements are not as robust as the proposed
AIS. They can run a mere handful of pages, whereas regulations
were required to limit EISs to 150 pages, except in cases of
"unusual scope or complexity," which are afforded 300.385 They do
not have the specific requirements of an EIS, "such as requiring
community outreach through the use of comment periods 38or6
obligating decision-makers to seriously consider alternatives."
Instead, they often involve reporting on the impact of an already
determined course of action. As a result, the reports are less
informative. And because the only question posed is an up or
down vote on a proposal, 38 7 which already has momentum behind
it, these impact statements are less likely to lead to better
As proposed here, the AIS law would require
alternatives.
something much more robust and consequential. If an AIS as
written looked like these other impact statements, it would be a
violation of the procedural requirements, which could then be
enforced in court.
Another reason for the apparent ineffectiveness of impact
statements may result from a mismatch between the goals of an
AIS and what advocates truly want. As discussed above, MiSs
have two goals: forcing early consideration of different options and
If the
the resulting externalities, and knowledge creation.
382 See generally Preparationof Fiscal Analysis, NAT'L COMM. STATE LEGISLATURES, Apr.
2002, http://www.ncsl.org/researci/elections-and-campaigns/fiscal-impact-statements.aspx.
383 See SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CAL. CODE div. A40, § 7(D) (2016).
3m See Jessica Erickson, Comment, Racial Impact Statements: Considering the
Consequences of Racial Disproportionalitiesin the Criminal Justice System, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 1425, 1444-45 (2014); London, supra note 309, at 226-31.
38640 C.F.R. § 1502.7 (2017).
386 See Erickson, supra note 384, at 1428 (arguing that RIS legislation could be more
effective if it resembled the EIS framework).
387 See, e.g., NAT'L COMM. STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 382 (describing how fiscal impact
statements are created only to aid voters in deciding how to vote on a given ballot measure).
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predictive policing system at issue turns out to be highly
discriminatory, AISs will not have the firepower to rectify the
results. The AIS is designed to change the decision process, and
failing that, it is fundamentally a transparency measure.
Transparency, however, does not automatically lead to
accountability, 38 8 so faulting a transparency statute for failing to
provide full reform is a case of mismatched expectations.
The sentencing context once again provides such an example.
Marc Mauer, Executive Director of the Sentencing Project and an
early proponent of the RIS strategy in sentencing, has argued that,
in addition to providing information, these statements could lead
legislatures to actually reduce the disparities. 3 9 Acknowledging
that such a desire was perhaps "wishful thinking,"390 it was
nevertheless clear that such reform was the intended goal of the
proposal. Therefore, if disparities are not reduced, RISs could be
seen as a failure.
By that metric, AISs may fail as well. But that is not the best
metric by which to measure success. If the AISs demonstrate
internally that predictive policing is flawed, then that will be an
invisible victory even if the AIS never appears in that form. If,
however, the AIS comes out and demonstrates that predictive
policing is highly discriminatory, while there is a chance that this
will cause such embarrassment that reform will result, there are
also good reasons to think further political intervention will be
required. This is especially true in light of the extreme emphasis
on procedural goals in the existing interpretations of NEPA. If
AISs are interpreted as purely procedural, they will lose even their
low level of substantive impact. While this may be an inherent
limitation of the impact statement model, it only suggests that the

388 See generally Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of
the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, NEW MEDIA &
SOC'Y 1 (2016). See also W.C. Bunting, The Regulation of Sentencing Decisions: Why
Information Disclosure Is Not Sufficient, and What to Do About It, 70 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRV.
AM. L. 41, 60 (2014) (arguing that the disclosure model "represents an overly sanguine view
of legislative decisionmaking").
389 Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing Unwarranted
Sentencing Disparities,5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19, 42-43 (2007).
390 Id. at 43. This is not to say that it is impossible though.
See Rachel E. Barkow,
Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1289 (2005) (arguing
that impact statements have made a difference in sentencing decisions).
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impact statements should not claim to do more than they are
capable of doing, not that they are valueless.
3. Static Assessments. A common criticism of NEPA since its
inception is that the assessment-either EIS or mitigated
FONSI-is performed before project implementation and there is
no monitoring to ensure the choices made work in reality. 391 This
is a problem because predictions can be wrong or the facts on the
ground can change, and what was once beneficial might become
harmful, or a constraint imposed on the project might no longer be
necessary. 392 This is a realistic issue for AISs as well, and perhaps
an even bigger one. A police department is likely to update their
algorithms over time. Crime statistics and demographics in a
given jurisdiction will likely change over time, and demographics
can change faster than environmental attributes. Having to redo
an AIS might prevent necessary changes to policy, or conversely,
not requiring an AIS update may allow the system to be out of
alignment and discriminate more than originally predicted.
In the environmental context, many solutions have been
proposed. David Hodas proposed a tort regime to place the
liability for future harm on the inaccurate predictor, coupled with
insurance to price it in initially. 393 Bradley Karkkainen proposed
mandatory monitoring and disclosure of the results, followed by
updated project plans when necessary. 394 Karakkainen's proposal
is an example of "adaptive management," which has become a key
395
concept for NEPA reformers in the environmental space.
Perhaps benchmarks could be created for future goals, backed up
by automatically triggered defunding mechanisms if they are not
391 See Hodas, supra note 351, at 188 ("NEPA's fundamental flaw is the little-appreciated
fact that no one is responsible for substantive errors in EIS evaluations.'); Karkkainen,
supra note 301, at 938.
392 See Karkkainen, supra note 296, at 938 ("[N]othing in NEPA requires or encourages
the agency to engage in any follow up effort to verify the predictions made in an EA or EIS,
or to adjust its decisions in light of what it subsequently learns." (footnote omitted)).
393 Hodas, supra note 351, at 188-92.
394 Karkkainen, supra note 296, at 938.
395 See Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46
AKRON L. REV. 933, 935 (2013) ("Adaptive management has become a dominant theme in
the scholarship and practice of environmental law, so dominant that many scholars and
managers assert that the only feasible option for environmental law is adaptive
management."). But see id. at 940 (questioning the centrality of adaptive management to
the future of environmental law because of its limits in reducing uncertainty and improving
management and regulatory outcomes, as well as costs associated with its use).
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All these ideas are worth exploring for the AIS
reached.
regulation. Ultimately, the broad strokes sketched here would
remain the same with additional pieces to be considered later, and
it is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate those different
proposals.
4. Trade Secrets. Every algorithmic accountability proposal
(accountability proposals for any technology, really) eventually
396
meets the question of how to handle the trade secret problem.
In short, many companies are protecting their algorithms by
claiming that they are trade' secrets and, therefore, cannot be
398
disclosed. 397 Despite often being of questionable legal merit,
such claims are being treated credulously by courts 399 and are
given great weight in public debates about "black box"
400
technologies.
39 See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal JusticeSystem, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5-6) (available
at https:/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2920883) ("Developers often assert
that details about how their tools function are trade secrets. As a result, they claim
entitlements to withhold that information from criminal defendants and their
attorneys. .. .'); see also David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in
Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 139 (2007) (discussing how the private
sector asserting trade secret protection when providing public infrastructure "frustrate[s]
the goals of public transparency and accountability').
397 Cf., e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014) ("No one can challenge the process of
[credit] scoring and their results because the algorithms are zealously guarded trade secrets.").
398 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 396, at 140 ('Trade secrecy law and practices serve many
useful and important purposes in private industry, but... their use in the public
infrastructure context is inappropriate, unexpectedly powerful, and doctrinally unsound.").
There is an ongoing debate about the nature of the trade secret right and whether it is
derived from tort or property. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating
Trade Secrets As IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 317-27 (2008) (discussing "the strengths
and weaknesses of each existing theory of trade secret protection"). Until recently, trade
secrets only legally existed within a trade secret lawsuit, which includes a claim of
misappropriation of said secret. See id. at 317. The idea of a freestanding property right on
which a legally mandated disclosure would infringe is a controversial one.
39 See Wexler, supranote 396, at 7-9.
40- See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY 193 (2015) ('Transparency [of
algorithms] was replaced by ironclad secrecy, both real and legal.., effectively creat[ing] a
property right in an algorithm without requiring its disclosure.'); Frank Pasquale,
Restoring Transparency in Automated Authority, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 235, 237
(2011) (discussing how creators of "black box" technologies, such as search engines or credit
rating tools, circumvent the required disclosure of the patent system by asserting trade
secret protection); Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Credit Scoring and Trade Secrecy: An Algorithmic
Quagmire or How the Lack of Transparency in Complex Financial Models Scuttled the
Finance Market, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 87, 117 (2011) ('The principal reason for the
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But none of that is altogether important to this proposal. AISs
can be created without disclosing trade secrets. It will be possible
to explain the rationales and choices made by policing agencies
and algorithm designers without disclosing the algorithm itself. It
is also possible to audit the different versions for disparate impact
without disclosing the underlying algorithms by treating them as
black boxes during the test.40 1 Or perhaps the audits can be runor the AISs written-by trusted public or private third parties
dedicated to such tasks. 40 2 There are therefore ways to create the
AIS without disclosing trade secrets.
Even if that were not the case, there is no reason, as a matter of
policy, why trade secrets should have preferential status over
something as important as fairness in criminal justice. There is no
constitutional right to trade secrets, 40 3 and a state that wanted to
pass an AIS statute could simply carve out an exception to their
application. Alternatively, the AS statute could require, as a part
of procurement law, that the software must be available for audit.
In sum, though there is no space here for a comprehensive
discussion of trade secrets, it may appear to be a bigger problem
than it actually is.
controversy over credit scores is that the method of calculation is kept secret from
consumers, advocates, and regulators. This calculation process has been called a 'black
box.' "); Sandra Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making
Does Not Exist in the General Data ProtectionRegulation, 7 IN'L DATA PRIVACY L. 76, 8688 (2017) (noting how trade secrets have limited transparency requirements in Europe's
data protection law).
401 See e.g., Kroll et al., supra note 320, at 660 ("Beyond transparency, auditing is another
strategy for verifying how a computer system works. An audit treats the decision process as a
black box whose inputs and outputs are visible but whose inner workings are unseen.'); see
also Christian Sandvig et al., Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for Detecting
Discrimination on Internet Platforms (May 22, 2014), http://www-personal.umich.edu-csand
vig/research/Auditing/o20Algorithms%20-.%20Sandvig/o20--%20ICA%202014%20Data%20an
d%20Discrimination%20Preconference.pdf (describing techniques for black-box audits of
algorithms).
402 See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation And Competition: The Need For Qualified
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 164 (2010) ("When
ranking systems are highly complex and innovation is necessary... a dedicated
governmental entity should be privy to their development and should serve as an arbiter
capable of providing guidance to courts that would otherwise be unable to assess complaints
about the results the algorithm generates.').
403 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984). While Ruckelshaus held
that trade secrets counted as property for the purpose of the Takings Clause, id. at 1014,
the Court also noted that property rights were created by the states, not the federal
Constitution. Id. at 1001.
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Commodifying Discrimination. Implicit in AISs is a
5.
recognition that the discriminatory harms cannot be eliminated
entirely unless the proposed course of action is blocked. As a
result, the harmful impact must be weighed against the benefits it
would achieve. In most contexts, that is not how people think
about discrimination. Traditionally, if discrimination existed, it
was to be stamped out, and inequality that. need not legally be
stamped out was not considered discrimination.4 0 4 By recognizing
that a certain level of discrimination might be tolerable as a
tradeoff for other policing goals, there is an extent to which this
proposal treats discrimination as a problem subject to cost-benefit
analysis. This leads to the objection that discrimination should
40 5
not be so commodified.
This objection has a few distinct flavors: a moral one, a practical
one, and a distributional one. 40 6 The moral objection claims that
certain values are simply incommensurable and that engaging in
The practical
the act of horse-trading on them is immoral.
objection notes that when amorphous normative concerns that are
not easily quantified enter the realm of cost-benefit analysis, they
tend to lose importance in the overall decision-making process, and
that a discourse that equates these values with other goods will
inevitably be willing to sell them off. Finally, the distributional
objection notes that costs and benefits will be seen differently by
different populations, and the powerful decision-making
40 7
populations are less likely to bear a greater brunt of the cost.
404 See Michael Selmi, StatisticalInequality and Intentional (Not Implicit) Discrimination,
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 200-01 (2016) ("[in the United States, as a matter of
policy, we are committed to remedying discrimination, not inequality. In other words, we
will only address inequality that is the product of discrimination.').
405 See, e.g., Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 REGULATION,
Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 33, 36 ('The notion of human rights involves the idea that people may
make certain claims to be allowed to act in certain ways or to be treated in certain ways,
even if the sum of benefits achieved thereby does not outweigh the sum of costs.").
406 See Robert H. Frank, Why is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 913, 913-20 (2000) (discussing objections to cost-benefit analysis).
407 There are other objections to pure cost-benefit analysis, such as the inherent
uncertainty of it due to the need to inject value judgments at one time or another, rendering
it arguably no better as a mode of analysis than comparing values in the abstract. See, e.g.,
Thomas C. Heller, The Importance of Normative Decision-Making: The Limitations of Legal
Economics as a Basis for a Liberal Jurisprudence-As Illustrated by the Regulation of
Vacation Home Development, 1976 WIs. L. REV. 385, 386 (contending that regulations will
often fail to achieve their objections if based only on cost-benefit analysis because many
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All of these concerns are well-founded and much debated, 408 and
they cannot be resolved here.
The necessity of balancing
incommensurable values is uncomfortable.

But necessity

4
it is.
09

Ultimately, balancing tests are ubiquitous

in the law and basically always compare two incommensurable
values. 410
Cost-benefit analysis is simply a decision-making
procedure that requires care in operation. Performed carefully, it
will generate the same debates about how discrimination concerns
should be valued as in any other discussion based in normative
concerns. 4 11 To suggest that discrimination cannot be subject to
measurement is to suggest it is a problem that can only be
eradicated but not reduced.
But no known decision-making
process can make that happen.
As Barocas and I observed in our prior work, data mining
technology forces us to reconcile with tough questions about
fairness that have previously been avoided:
[T]he pressing challenge does not lie with ensuring
procedural fairness through a more thorough stamping
out of prejudice and bias but rather with developing
ways of reasoning to adjudicate when and what
amount of disparate impact is tolerable. Abandoning a
belief in the efficacy of procedural solutions leaves
policy makers in an awkward position because there is
no definite or consensus answer to questions about the
fairness of specific outcomes. These need to be worked
out on the basis of different normative principles. At
some point, society will be forced to acknowledge that

critical variables are "economically indeterminant"). Here, I am concerned with the specific
objections against turning an issue seen as a normative one into an issue of cost.
408 See generally Frank, supra note 406, at 913.
409 See John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE
L.J. 1603, 1607 (2013) ("A primary reason for [the] survival [of cost-benefit analysis] is
evident and voiced often: no comparably rigorous, quantitative, and workable alternative
exists for commensurating a law's positive and negative consequences.").
410 See, e.g., Patrick M. McFadden, The BalancingTest, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 624-25 (1988).
411 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE
L.J. 165, 167 (1999) ("CBA is a decision procedure, not a moral standard.").
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this is really a discussion about what constitutes a
tolerable level of disparate impact .... 412
The only real alternative to balancing is a burden-shifting
framework akin to Title VII disparate impact analysis. 4 13 While
that method avoids commodification of discrimination, it all but
guarantees that no discrimination harm will outweigh a legitimate
business decision. This is because, in the absence of balancing, all
that is asked is whether the decision was legitimate, not if is it
outweighed by other concerns. Thus, its direct impact on
discrimination is worse. At least with cost-benefit analysis, there
is an argument to be made that the decision is just not important
enough when compared to the harm. Rejecting balancing for fear
of quantifying discrimination is an example of letting the perfect
be the enemy of the good.
The analogy to environmental law is helpful for considering this
objection in reverse. While discrimination is seen as a distinctly
moral problem, it may be necessary to sometimes treat it as
measurable. Environmental concerns come from the opposite
position. They have nearly always been subjected to cost-benefit
analysis, yet pollution and climate change can cause massive
human death tolls and should probably be considered moral issues
more often than they are. There are indeed rhetorical dangers in
classifying either problem as a commodity, but the language of
cost-benefit analysis at least allows for the possibility that a
problem can be reduced without being wholly solved and is, in
principle, no different in terms of how normative concerns are
valued. To let this objection stand in the way is just to blind
oneself to reality.
V. CONCLUSION

Predictive policing is rapidly being adopted throughout the
country, though it is unclear as of yet whether the technologies
even offer any tangible benefit over traditional policing, and there
is precious little insight into its discriminatory effects. Machine
learning poses new regulatory challenges in many parts of society,
412
413

Barocas & Selbst, supra note 19, at 728.
See supranotes 260-64 and accompanying text.
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but when it comes to police in particular, the track record on
discrimination cries out for new forms of oversight and
transparency. From "driving while black" and stop-and-frisk, to
the events that led to the Black Lives Matter movement, suspicion
of and violence against people of color is a consistent feature of
policing in America. Police departments must ensure that they
are not adopting technology that produces limited benefits while
'414
equating "criminal" with "black.
The AIS provides a good starting point for regulating the
disparate impact in predictive policing.
Like environmental
problems in the 1970s, the biggest barrier to regulation is the lack
of information about the specific instances of the problem.
Perhaps the benefits of predictive policing will outweigh the
harms, or perhaps the harms can be mitigated. Neither advocates
nor critics of predictive policing technology know the answer
because the information does not exist. With AISs, police and the
software manufacturers they hire will be required to produce the
information that will better inform public debate, as they are the
only ones that can. The AIS proposal's focus on procedural
regularity and transparency allows police to take the lead and use
their expertise to design efficient crime-prevention systems while
requiring that they consider the externalities of their chosen
course of action.
If they remain unregulated, predictive policing systems will
harden and perpetuate the racial discrimination that pervades the
criminal justice system. Unless society recognizes the urgency and
acts soon, we will become inured to the toxic discriminatory
emissions of predictive policing systems. The narrative pull of
"trusting the data" will hardcode racial discrimination into the
technology, making it even harder to eradicate later. Given the
history of discriminatory policing, no technology or police practice
should ever be adopted without investigating how it impacts
minority populations. Society cannot afford to let the allure of new
technologies blind people to the systemic inequalities they can
perpetuate.
Impact statements are growing in popularity as a response to
new and complicated technologies. In Santa Clara, California, the

414

See Butler, supra note 196, at 253-54.
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law requiring police to issue Anticipated Surveillance Impact
Reports was passed in 2016. 415 Similar bills are pending in

Oakland and New York

City. 4 16

The European laws requiring

impact assessments are also quite new. The UK's equality duty
stems from a 2010 law, while the DPIAs came about in the EU's
GDPR and Policing Directive that passed in 2016.417 Oversight of
predictive policing should emulate and strengthen those efforts by
drawing on the original environmental regulations that spawned
all of the rest. Today's data-driven technologies are simply too
complicated
and too
important to
implement without
understanding the consequences for society.

SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CAL. CODE div. A40 (2016).
N.Y.C., N.Y., INT. No. 1482-2017 (Proposed Official Draft 2017); OAKLAND CAL.,
SURVEILLANCE AND COMMUNITY SAFETY ORDINANCE (Proposed Official Draft 2017).
417 Equality Act, 2010, c. 15; sch. 19; GDPR, supra note 307.
415
416
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